Sorry. I wrote the above without seeing the article you posted.

This is from Wikipedia:

In the summer of 2002, Zarqawi settled in northern Iraq, where he joined the Islamist Ansar al-Islam group that fought against the Kurdish-nationalist forces in the region. He became a leader in the group, although the extent of his authority has not been established. According to Perspectives on World History and Current Events (PWHCE), a not-for-profit project based in Melbourne, Australia, “Zarqawi was well positioned to lead the Islamic wing of the insurgency when the March 2003 invasion took place. Whether he remained in Ansar al-Islam camps until April 2003 or laid the preparations for the war during extensive visits to Baghdad and the Sunni Triangle is uncertain, but clearly he emerged as an important figure in the insurgency soon after the Coalition invasion.”

This is the conclusion of an WaPo article about the inspector general’s report on this stuff, cited by Wikipedia:

Zarqawi, whom Cheney depicted yesterday as an agent of al-Qaeda in Iraq before the war, was not then an al-Qaeda member but was the leader of an unaffiliated terrorist group who occasionally associated with al-Qaeda adherents, according to several intelligence analysts. He publicly allied himself with al-Qaeda in early 2004, after the U.S. invasion.

Well, that makes me feel a lot better! Zarqawi was only “occasionally associated with al Qaeda adherents.” What’s to worry?

The article is also about the operationality of the connectivism al Qaeda/Saddam, not about nonoperational connectivity. In fact, the article confirms such connectivity:

It quoted an August 2002 CIA report describing the relationship as more closely resembling “two organizations trying to feel out or exploit each other” rather than cooperating operationally.

So, at the time, Saddam and al Qaeda were only trying to negotiate a more operational form of connectivism. Cheney said they were operational but they weren’t. They were only pre-operational.

Should this make me change my opinion in support of the invasion? Did Cheney lie? Maybe so.

I can’t help thinking that this point is really too minor to justify my changing my position. If relations between al Qaeda and Saddam were only pre operational, then it’s probably a good thing we invaded when we did. Later, when they finally became operational, it might have been immeasurably harder to invade and even more necessary to do it. Remember we invaded Afghanistan (aka the good war) because it was harboring al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is on record as wanting WMD potential. Once the connectivity Saddam/al Qaeda had achieved full operationality, we would then be justifying an invasion on that basis. Then we would find out what WMD capability really means. Remember the panic that Saddam would use the WMDs on us during the invasion? If you were the “decider” here, what would you do?

Instead of being a reason to change my position, I would think that it would be a reason for an opponent of the war to change his or hers. What would have happened if we hadn’t invaded and allowed this pre operational connecitvity to flourish into full connectitud? Does that sound scary to you?

But Saddam also had operational connectivity with other terrorist organizations that are well-known. The article you posted above says this as well. I don’t see why it should have mattered that Saddam only had operational connectivity with “other terrorist groups” that shared al Qaeda’s enmity with us. If Saddam had the WMDs and was cooperating only with “other terrorist groups,” why is it so unreasonable for Bush and other national security authorities to take this seriously as a threat?

What’s missing here? I don’t get it. Just from the stuff presented here it seems that Bush/Cheney exaggerated the Saddam/al Qaeda operational connectivity. The truth seems to be that this connectivity was only pre operational. Maybe it was a lie; maybe it was an honest mistake; maybe it was conscious exaggeration. Maybe future historians will find that Bush/Cheney were right all along. But I don’t see how this would ever determine anyone’s support for the war back in 2002-03, even without considering the multiple other reasons to support it. If I had known this back then, I would have still supported the war. That’s because I knew that al Qaeda/Saddam/other terrorist groups; etc etc wanted to kill you and your family.

Are we talking about an al Qaeda/Saddam/9/11 connection now? When did we start doing that? Are you referring to operational connectivism? I don’t know about that but I guess you’re right for now. Remember the legend of the Prague Atta/Saddam secret police meeting, etc etc. But who knows what information will be uncovered by future historians? I wouldn’t exactly blow my mind to find out that there was a direct operational connection there.

I was obviously talking about a nonoperational connectivism. I find that this is unexceptional and further just one more of many justifications for the invasion, since we thought Saddam had WMDs and further knew that al Qaeda wanted some to kill you with.

The report released by the Joint Forces Command five years after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq said it found no “smoking gun” after reviewing about 600,000 Iraqi documents captured in the invasion and looking at interviews of key Iraqi leadership held by the United States, Pentagon officials said.

The assessment of the al Qaeda connection and the insistence that Hussein had weapons of mass destruction were two primary elements in the Bush administration’s arguments in favor of going to war with Iraq.

The Pentagon’s report also contradicts then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who said in September 2002 that the CIA provided “bulletproof” evidence demonstrating “that there are, in fact, al Qaeda in Iraq.”

Although other groups, like the September 11 commission, have concluded that there was no link between Hussein and al Qaeda, the Pentagon was able to analyze much more information.
The documents cited in the report do reveal that Hussein supported a number of terrorists and terrorist activities inside and outside Iraq. “The Iraqi regime was involved in regional and international terrorist operations prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. The predominant targets of Iraqi state terror operations were Iraqi citizens, both inside and outside of Iraq,” according to the report. Most of the terrorism was aimed at keeping Hussein and his Baath party in power, according to Pentagon officials.

“State sponsorship of terrorism became such a routine tool of state power that Iraq developed elaborate bureaucratic processes to monitor progress and accountability in the recruiting, training and resourcing of terrorists,” according to the report.

The report cited such examples as training for car bombs and suicide bombings in 1999 and 2000, both of which U.S. and Iraqi forces have struggled to contain since the rise of the insurgency in summer 2003

Yes, I call the idea that there was no link between al Qaeda and Saddam before the invasion a “canard.”

No, I didn’t support this with anecdotal evidence from a CIA agent, etc etc. You must be confusing me with someone else. I simply quoted a Friedman column and my “canard” comment was a throwaway. But Friedman never used anecdotal evidence from a CIA agent, etc etc. He just observed that by making al Qaeda fight in Iraq, and by defeating them, we were protecting ourselves against further attacks by them. That seems like a reasonable conclusion to draw. Why not?

So what are you talking about? I know you’re upset, and I’m sorry my diatribes have driven you to this point. For now, try and calm down a bit. Later, I’d suggest just scrolling past anything with my name on it. That way, you wouldn’t have to go through this anymore. You tried to refute something I never said and even then you failed to refute the al Qaeda/Saddam connection.

Everybody knows that Zarqawi’s group (al Qaeda in Iraq, no less!) was in that country soon after the invasion of Afghanistan. Also, there was an al Qaeda affiliate in the north before the invasion: Ansar al Islam (or something). These would be connections enough for me, since they could get WMD potential from Saddam and then use it against us. Later it turned out that Saddam didn’t have the WMDs, but that has no bearing on the debate in 2002 because at the time everybody thought that he did. If you’ll recall, at the time the nation was panicked about al Qaeda using some kind of WMD as a follow-on attack.

Better luck next time. Wait! I forgot: There won’t be a next time since you’re going to ignore my comments from now on. I hope.