Now before Roland jumps down my throat for suggesting he is advancing his own domino theory, let me be clear I am not. I understand that he views what he is describing as unintended consequences. But if his claim were to be accepted as true in the popular imagination, it could serve as a substantial piece of the argument of those who might do that in the future. That isn’t reason to hardheadedly deny the possibility of what Roland suggests, but it is plenty of reason to challenge him to show evidence for it.

To show evidence, it is not necessary for him to dig up historical tracts showing that what he is describing is possible, even plausible. I am stipulating that the literature establishes that such things happen. And even on the face of it, I stipulate that it is at least not a nonsensical speculation (Mark provides one possibility for how it might be fleshed out). So evidence for the broad historical theory is not what I am asking of Roland, but rather I am asking for some evidence from the ongoing events to which Roland is here trying to apply said historical/IR insight, showing that what those theories (I would surmise very cautiously and in a highly hedged way) predict is in fact going on in the case in question. If that sounds like a tall order, I have sympathy for that view, as I pointed out above that much of the information we have thus far is anectdotal and unreliable. That said, there is a lot of information coming out of Iran, and if Roland is inclined, he is free to comb through it to see if he can detect pieces or trends that might support his contention.

Lastly, I am not sure how to treat the point that this is, after all, just Roland’s belief. That is the case for scholars everywhere. Some share the broad conensus on a question, others are outliers. But none withdraw their contentions from challenge by the scholarly community and still expect respect and acceptance for their views. Saying, “This is what I believe” in a public forum, and then following that up with “but I don’t expect you all to believe it too, so I am going to decline to offer evidence for my contentions” is simply to fold your tent and go home, with the effect being that you never spoke. I suppose if all Roland is asking is to be left alone and allowed to believe what he believes, we should allow him to do that. But posting your views in a public forum and tenaciously holding to them belies the notion that that is Roland’s intention. It is Roland’s right to assert his belief in an idea in a public space and stick by it as long as he likes, but by doing so the implication is that others should believe it as well. The alternatives are for him to say that he’s okay with us not believing the idea as long as we’re okay not believing the truth, or else admit that his idea is not true to the point where we should believe it.

To sum up, Roland has asserted (and I for the purpose of the argument am stipulating) that there is sufficient IR literature to justify inquiring into whether the instability in Iraq created by the U.S. invasion led to or contributed to Iranian citizens rising (or being able to rise) against the certification of a disputed election in their country. What he has not offered is any evidence from the contemporary events to show to what extent that theoretical possibility is in fact a concrete reality. Absent any such evidence (he needn’t prove anything beyond doubt), my view is that extreme skepticism (pending evidence) is justified — on the merits in any case, but especially so given the highly political (politicizable?) nature of the claim he is making. That view, I admit, reflects my own judgement and can’t be shown to be inherently correct or mistaken.

I’m pretty damn near a non-interventionist, but I think your point is tough to refute.

Yes, but that is what making calls on social sciences entails as the events unfold in front of you. Perhaps enough information will be made available and pondered in the years to come of these events, and maybe they won’t. But if we at an internet blog are discussing an issue that is developing as we speak, we will go with the historical examples and information available. Otherwise, why even come to talk about this at all?

“Unspecified historical analogy is not evidence for a theory.”

You are right, and to be honest, I am not going to be putting the effort into going back into the books and pulling those historical documents here. My laziness is not a defense, but when it comes to discussing current events on a blog, I am not going to dedicate that effort.

I think you will find that every post on this site as well as most articles and pieces on current events is not going to contain the level of detail you are requesting in a comments section. Perhaps it is a greater criticism of this type of debate, but if you went through all of the threads here, you would likely encounter the same.

Nor do I think you have to believe anything I say on any of this; you can surely say all of this is hogwash. But I am more interested in hearing people’s theories on why things are happening in Iran, and while it’s fine you are holding off on making any kind of assessment, I am more interested in getting someone’s perspective on this and the reasons they came to their conclusion.

You have said that I need to offer evidence for my skepticism of your theory. But my point all along has been that the way inquiry works is that the person who advances a theory needs to offer some evidence in order to be in a position to expect it to be refuted. There is no reason to give even enough credence to a theory to bother trying to refute it until there is evidence. Unspecified historical analogy is not evidence for a theory. So while neither of us can say for sure what the cause is (I am not even trying), it is not the case that skepticism of your claim is equivalent to advancing a separate claim of my own.

I am doing the easy end of IR analysis however; looking at events that have already happened and finding similarities between them. It is much more difficult to make predictions as to what an act in the international system will actually produce before it occurs. If a neocon theorist were to say “Removal of Saddam’s regime (X) plus democratic Iraqi government (Y) = democratic revolution in Iran (Z)”, they may see some vindication now, but it could have easily (or could still produce) a completely different result. So I don’t know if their prediction is a strong one, but saying a change in the regional power structure produces changes in how neighbouring states operate seems pretty sound historical.

The regime changes in Iraq, considering the country’s history and proximity to Iran, is simple to large a variable to avoid. Therefore, I put weight and emphasis on it.