Engagement: The Breakfast of Champions
Reading through this story coming out of Iran, I find myself increasingly agreeing with Maziar Bahari about pressing engagement with Iran in terms of pointing out how the actions of the current government have “consequences”. As more and more stories like the aforementioned, along with Bahari’s Jon Stewart story come to light via the various people both inside and outside Iran pierce what remains of the veil of secrecy around Iranian culture/internal ongoings, I think we are exposed to a picture of a regime of rapidly vanishing legitimacy that is flailing in all directions to avoid/delay the inevitable.
To my mind, letting that process play out (ie. allowing the current regime to collapse under the weight of its own internal inconsistencies) while diplomatically gesturing towards the obviousness of the situation is the only sane best of all possible, if not far more challenging than it is often given credit, courses of action.
It remains true that throughout the Middle East there are real instances of attitudes and actions towards human rights that constitute reasonable causes for concern. While we might be in a place where most aren’t interested in making the Middle East over in the West’s image (were such a thing even possible), that doesn’t mean that we also cease to be concerned about the rights afforded women in Saudi Arabia or homosexuals in Dubai or the like. And if those reasonable concerns are to really be addressed and the security risks posed by animosity between the so-called “clash of civilizations” averted, then a real partner is needed in the Middle East.
Perhaps counter-intuitively, it makes sense to me that Iran represents the greatest possibility for that partner.
It seems absolutely certain that Iraq, the most obvious example of a more hawkish approach to addressing those issues, is completely incapable of being that partner. Sure, Iraq in and of itself no longer presents any kind of security risk to the West (assuming, of course, that is presented a credible risk pre-2003), but part of the calculus in that regards stems from the fact that Iraq is largely a broken country that lacks any credibility in the region. Iraq is, literally, the outcome of a “nuke ‘em all and let God sort ‘em out” attitude that remains surprisingly prevalent vis-a-vis Iran and the region generally. Any reconstruction of the country has taken place under the hospice and constant watch of, primarily, US armed forces. Not only, as a result, have a great many American lives been lost in the process, but the process itself is tainted by its lack of integrity.
Who can honestly say that the course of the last almost seven years is one that a majority of Iraqi citizens would have chosen for themselves? No one even bothers to argue about the moral status of Saddam Hussein anymore, but beating the country into submission and then expecting it to rebuild as anything more than a shell of an autonomous nation is, perhaps, the height of willful ignorance. If Iraq has proven one thing, it is that nation building by force is a conceptually and morally bankrupt paradigm. It neither works out the way we envision, nor creates the kind of vibrant nation one sees is necessary in the Middle East.
What then do we gain by bombing the ever-loving-God out of Iran? Well, if your goal is to break the nation, I suppose bombing it makes perfect sense. Of course, doing so also happens to dramatically affect the one thing that Iran has going for it, that also happens to comprise the primary reason for seeing it as the best chance for an effective partner , and that has been missing from almost every other nation building project in which the West has engaged: an autonomous and organic widespread movement for democracy, self-determination, and government accountability. I mean, talk all you want about strategic targeting and the proficiency and precision of the tools of warfare in the twenty-first century, but bombig remains a messy affair. So to think that massive air strikes of the kind that it would take to “knock Iran out” can be done in a clean and non-disruptive fashion to the general populace is to be dreaming in a technicolor that belongs only to a species much further advanced than us.
In this regard, I actually can’t wrap my head around the logic here: Iran has the one thing that real democratic revolution requires and that history has demonstrated time and time again cannot be fabricated or manufactured, and you want to bomb it smithereens. Call me crazy, but that seems like fool proof plan to further entrench the very attitudes that lead people to such concern about the need to bomb places like Iran in the first place.
And the real irony of that situation is that those who strongly advocate for a military solution in Iran will often talk about the decision around that course of action as “serious” and of “great gravity”.
I disagree. I think, in fact, a decision to bomb Iran is a relatively easy affair, insofar as it constitutes a short-sighted scorched earth approach to a potential ally of great significance. As previously mentioned, the much more challenging option is to walk the tight rope of remaining engaged in the affairs of Iran in such a way as to avoid being seen as infringing upon its autonomy, while at the same time ensuring that one’s engagement doesn’t ultimately alienate the burgeoning movement towards freedom that refuses to abate in the country. The kind of tack and subtlety such engagement requires makes the decision to bomb Iran look like a play-doh date. And unlike the decision to bomb, which has a short time horizon for effect and little to no longer range potentials for positive resolution, a successful engagement strategy could be precisely what is required to finally overcome the very real threats placed in advanced motion by 9-11.
Those up to the challenge can apply within or else heed Kurt Vonnegut’s timeless advice: if you can do a half-assed job of anything, you’re a one-eyed man in a kingdom of the blind.
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11 comments
Hmmm what do you think Obama’s response should be to Iran right now? They seem to be furiously reneging on even a figleaf of a deal on their nuclear fuel. I don’t fancy a bombing campaign or invasion myself. The only things in Iran we can bomb we probably don’t want to and really the only things in Iran we want to bomb we probably can’t reach. They learned the lesson of Osirak too well. Now maybe the Israeli’s have something up their sleeve. But unless we want them to proceed with it we probably can’t just sit back and do nothing as Iran renegs.
Scott H. Payne
November 27th, 2009 at 3:50 pm
I would offer that Obama should be pushing Iran around everything on which they are reneging. Engagement doesn’t mean rolling over and it doesn’t mean appeasement. It does mean; however, maintaining some form of a relationship, even if said relationship is predominantly of a prickly nature. That relationship can be a sort of “on the record” means of tracking what a country is doing and this is, I think, what Bahari means in terms of maintaining engagement to demonstrate the consequences of actions. It’s hard to hold someone to account when you refuse to have any engagement with them whatsoever.
And I think if/when things boil over in Iran vis-a-vis the protests, it gives Obama an ability to go back and say that while he didn’t want to become involved in another country’s internal affairs, he did keep at Iranian officials as a means of cataloging various issues through discussions. Discussion of human rights violations wouldn’t, obviously, be unmarked territory for a US president, so it doesn’t seem unreasonable for it to be a a point of contention for Obama to bring up.
But, as mentioned in the post, I think walking the tight rope between responsible engagement on the issue and unnecessary intervention by an outside country is a trickier tight rope to walk than my explanation let’s on. Especially as regards the perceptions of dissenting Iranians.
At the end of the day, though, none of that is available to you if your attitude is “bomb ‘em”. You just wipe that whole field of play off the map altogether. I don’t know how any Iranian looks at the decision to bomb the country and doesn’t see that as reason for mistrust, even if the targets are military in nature.
North
November 28th, 2009 at 7:18 am
So do you think we should be vigerously persuing sanctions now?
Although the present regime may be experiencing “rapidly vanishing legitimacy,” what is the alternative? I think you ore overly optimistic if you believe there will be any immediate (within the near future) liberalization. In fact I read somewhere, sorry no reference, that the Revolutionary Guard is consolidating power because its commanders are well aware of the floundering of the civilian government. I am absolutely against any military action in Iran (at least overt conventional attacks) but how does one deal with a theocratic military/industrial/scientific complex which has consolidated power and refuses even a facade of democratic government?
I largely agree with the point here. It is a difficult situation to grasp because I think we are largely powerless to speed the changes we want to see in Iran. In that respect, I think the best thing to be done is try to defuse some of the fear motivating calls for military action. I have never heard a convincing account of why Iran would unilaterally deploy a nuclear missile on Israel, given the existing deterrent.
North
November 28th, 2009 at 10:30 pm
Do you think they’d be similarily hesitant to hand such a device over to one of their client organizations? Hamas or Hezbollah? Or maybe just radioactive bombs? I doubt that any of the usual suspects would support turning Iran into glass just because some militant group rendered an Israeli community uninhabitable with such a hard to track device.
BCChase
November 29th, 2009 at 6:13 pm
I think the rhetoric coming out of Israel and the knowledge that Hamas and Hezbollah are client organizations would lead to an attack on Iran fairly quickly. And assuming the Iranian government’s primary motive is to hold onto power, I don’t see how attacking Israel unilaterally helps that. Having nukes, sure, but using them, not clear to me.
North
November 29th, 2009 at 6:23 pm
I agree to a certain extent. But what we have to keep in mind is that for the Israelis the calculations are very different than they are for Americans. There’s no reason for Iran to be sponsoring anti-Israeli militant groups right now; but they are. So that then makes the arguement “there’s no reason for Iran to nuke Israel.” a rather weak one. I agree that from our standpoint in America the ideal situation is to hope that the revolutionaries liberalize Iran before a nuclear device is functional. If they don’t then we shrug and move on. But the Israelis don’t have that kind of strategic depth. Though I’m skeptical that they are capable of actually neutralizing the Iranian program I do think that they have good reasons to try. If we want to encourage them not to try then we need an alternative to convince them. Personally I’m hoping Obama goes for some serious sanctions.
BCChase
November 29th, 2009 at 7:17 pm
This is where I am most curious: how insanely religious do we think the Iranian government is? Because sponsoring religious terrorism on a small-scale versus nuclear scale has drastically different outcomes. A nuclear attack on Israel, even via Hamas or Hezbollah, would almost certainly bring war on Iran, maybe nuclear conflict. That could seriously weaken the Iranian government, or at least the current regime’s hold on power. And if Iran were the ones to strike first, they would get less support, from inside the country and outside, than if Israel attacks first. So to me, to assume Iran would attack first, you must assume either their religious insanity re: Israel’s existence overrides their need for regional power, or that they are willing to bring war on their own country to try and create a common enemy in Israel. But if they were going to do the latter, it would be far easier to stay the course, develop nukes and then wait for Israel to attack them. So basically we are down to religious insanity. I can understand Israel’s fear of this. But overestimating how far the Iranian government is willing to go grants them more power.
I don’t say I have a solution, just that I worry that as long as America or Israel’s primary motivation is (possibly) irrational fear of Iran, they have ceded them too much.
North
November 29th, 2009 at 9:07 pm
Perhaps so and in America’s case the cost of underestimating them is (comparatively) small; a lost city or so. For the Israelis the cost would be pretty much their entire country so one can understand why they would be less sanguine at the prospect. Even if they did believe that the west would nuke Iran in retaliation (an interesting question in of itself, would we really retaliate on Iran nuclearly for the crimes of it’s government or even just a rebel wing of it’s government.) I doubt that would be of much consolation to their vaporized populace.
And yes, maybe there’s too much ceding of fear to Iran. But considering the stakes I think the best way to prevent an Israeli attack would be to have some credible non-violent solution to offer. If we just mumble about the cycle of violence and all we have to fear is fear itself then I wouldn’t be surprised if they go in with planes and special forces (though I doubt they could completely wipe out the Iranian nuclear project).
So much for “engagement,” the Iranians announced that they are going to build more enrichment plants.
http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/World-News/Iran-To-Build-10-New-Uranium-Enrichment-Plans-State-Media-Has-Announced/Article/200911415478325?lpos=World_News_Carousel_Region_0&lid=ARTICLE_15478325_Iran_To_Build_10_New_Uranium_Enrichment_Plans%2C_State_Media_Has_Announced