Odds of winning by going for it = (Odds of getting a first down * Odds of winning the game if you get a first down) + (Odds of failing to get a first down * Odds of the Colts NOT scoring a TD from 30 yards out)

Odds of winning by punting = Odds of Colts NOT scoring a touchdown from about 70 yards out

Let me give another example. Over many years, the Yankees have brought in Mariano Rivera to close hundreds of games. He’s one of the best, if not THE best relief pitcher in baseball. Bringing him in to close a game is as close to being a no-brainer decision as you’ll find in all of sports. It has been a successful decision hundreds of times in the past, at a very high percentage.

Now, let’s say Rivera comes into a 1-run game, and allows two runs to lose the game. Did Girardi make a mistake by bringing in Rivera? Of course not. The result of that game was not important. It was the process that was important. Girardi made a decision that maximized his team’s chances of winning. Just because it happened not to work this one time, doesn’t mean it was the wrong decision.

I also wanted to point out that Sean Payton of the Saints goes for it on 4th and short very often (though usually in the opponent’s half of the field). Sometimes it works and sometimes it doesn’t. But it works often enough that the Saints have probably scored more points and won more games over the years than they wouldhave if they had gone the “safe” route and punted or kicked FGs ever time.

Also, what if the Patriots had punted away and the Colts had still engineered a game-winning drive? Would you be saying “The Patriots made the wrong decision, they should have gone for it on 4th down!”?

Next, you say that the Patriots had stopped the Colts on a majority of drives, so the Patriots should have punted. But you’re ignoring the other relevant factors. Namely, the odds of the Patriots winning if they go for it and convert and the odds of the Patriots winning if they go for it and don’t convert. The equations calculating the odds are as follows:

Odds of winning by going for it = (Odds of getting a first down * Odds of winning the game if you get a first down) + (Odds of failing to get a first down * Odds of the Colts scoring a TD from 30 yards out)

Odds of winning by punting = Odds of Colts scoring a touchdown from about 70 yards out

If the result of the first equation is greater than the result of the second equation, you go for it. If not, you punt. The problem is coming up with values for those variables. The only things you know outright are that the odds of winning if converting the 4th down are close to 100%, and the odds of the Colts scoring a TD from 30 yards out is greater than the odds of the Colts scoring a TD from 70 yards out

Brian Burke of advancednflstats.com looked at the actual results of actual NFL games over several years (no teoretical percentages. All of it was actual, observed data) and found that teams on average convert 4th and 2 about 60% of the time, teams score from 30 yards out with 2 minutes left inthe game 53% of the time, and teams score from 70 yards out with 2 minutes left in the game 30% of the time (which supports your “The Patriots would stop them a majority of the time argument).

Now, obviously that is the average of all teams put in those positions, and you can’t use those exact numbers to calculate the odds. Every situation is different, for various reasons (the qualities of the offenses and defenses, the weather, the fatigue of the players, etc.) But they’re baseline numbers around which you can make estimates.

I used the equations above and plugged in various different combination of odds of converting the 4th down, and of the Colts scoring from both 30 yards out and 70 yards out. In virtually all of them, the odds of winning when going for it were greater than the odds of winning when punting. For instance, let’s say the Patriots didn’t have a 60% chance of converting, but only a 40% chance of converting. And let’s say the Colts had a 50% chance of scoring from 70 yards out. The Colts odds of scoring from 30 yards out would need to be 85% to make punting the right choice! And even then, it’s only a 1% advantage.

Clearly, nobody knows exactly what the odds are, but for anybody to say that Belichick DEFINITELY should have punted is ridiculous. It was a close call either way.

Lastly, I think you’re right that experience needs to count for something. But experience is not infallible. Most conventional wisdom was derived decades ago, and things change over time. There was a time when conventional wisdom said that a series of short, timing-based passing routes would never work. But Bill Walsh experimented and discovered that the conventional wisdom was wrong. His “West Coast Offense” can and does work. There was a time when running the ball out a shotgun formation was unheard of. Now teams do it all the time, and do so successfully. Conventional wisdom said that something like the Wildcat formation would never work. Then Bill Parcells (a football traditionalist if there ever was one) and tony Sparano tried it out and it helped a 1-15 team improve to a division champion 11-5 team.

Conventional wisdom finds itself outdated often, because the game changes over time. The same things that worked 50 years won’t necessarily work now, just like how the things that work now might not have worked 50 years ago.

Lastly, I think you need to consider another factor that comes into play as far as coaching decisions go, and that’s the desire to defer blame. Every coach can be fired at any time, and I think many coaches make decisions to avoid criticism from the fans and the media. The safe, timid play call defers blame to the players. “Hey, I put the game in their hands, they just didn’t execute”. I don’t necessarily think coaches do this on purpose, but their job security (or lack thereof) has to affect them at least subliminally. It happens all the time, where a team is down 21-0 in the 4th quarter and they kick a FG instead of going for it, or a 1-9 team punts on 4th and 1 from the opponents 40 yard line.

Oh, one last thing and then I promise I’m finished. Whoever said that stats people think Adam Dunn’s defensive liabilities outweigh his offensive contributions is outright wrong. It may bite into his offensive contribution, but his offense clearly outweighs his defense under ANY advanced statistical system.

Even if you throw out “complex” statistics (which I wouldn’t), you have to figure what Bill was thinking was that the Patriots had a better than 50% shot of making the first down and the Colts had a better than 50% chance of scoring the touchdown, which, as statistics showed was not a bad assumption. The decision was proper–at worst its a coin flip where he controls his own destiny. At best, he is making a brilliant decision that failed a small percentage of the time.

As for the overall debate, on some occasions Freddie you seem to suggest that people have justified going for it by using their statistical methods to manipulate the data to back up their opinions. Surely if their methods are devised prior to the event happening then this accusation holds no water? obviously people on here and so on can then pick and chose the methods they use to defend their opinion but Belichik can’t be accused of that. He has a method for doing things and over the long haul its proven very successful.

Aside from any statistical way of looking at things I personally would be far more happy to go for it in that situation. The colts were moving the ball pretty well and the pats were looking gassed.

Most of the statistical arguments suggest the decision is about 50/50, given this doesn’t it suggest that the decision was in fact based on footballing instinct as much as the arguments made using numbers? I guess people could claim ego made him go for it wanting people to say how smart he is but the impression I’ve always got is that his main motivation is a desire to win and I can’t see that he would have gone against what he thought gave them the best chance.

It would be very interesting to see the media’s reaction had they indeed got the first down. I suspect that the majority who are slating the decision would be praising its gutsy-ness and forward thinking.

No one actually thinks a walk is as good as a hit. That’s what little league coaches say to their hitters when the pitcher is having trouble throwing strikes.