Marc Lynch, writing about the (non)coverage in the Arab press of the failed Detroit airplane bombing and its implications:

The Arab media’s indifference to the story speaks to a vitally important trend. Al-Qaeda’s attempted acts of terrorism simply no longer carry the kind of persuasive political force with mass Arab or Muslim publics which they may have commanded in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.   Even as the microscopically small radicalized and mobilized base continues to plot and even to thrive in its isolated pockets, it has largely lost its ability to break out into mainstream public appeal.  I doubt this would have been any different even had the plot been successful — more attention and coverage, to be sure, but not sympathy or translation into political support.  It is just too far gone to resonate with Arab or Muslim publics at this point.

The downgrading of al-Qaeda and the “War on Terror” by the Obama administration helps this trend along, even if the dynamics which produced it were largely local and internal to the Arab and Muslim worlds.   The failure of the failed plot to capture even a modicum of mainstream Arab public interest speaks volumes to the robustness of this trend… though the frankly disturbing enthusiasm for the story in some quarters in the U.S. suggests that not everybody is happy to see al-Qaeda recede.

This is the kind of thing I meant by saying al-Qaeda are like the anarchists of old.

According to Lynch, if we want to know what’s more important to the Arab press, we should be studying the Saudi-Yemen border conflict (which is a HUGE story that never gets attention), Gaza, and the Iranian protests.

I’ve been largely out of the loop for the last week, so there’s quite a bit to catch up on.  A quick word on the attempted terrorist attack on the airliner in Detroit–and then a synthetic remark at the end.

Whatever else comes up in the pseudo-analysis of the (thankfully) failed terrorist attack, we see yet again that the terrorists are largely from middle to upper classes.  The ones who are recruited to perform suicide attacks are usually young and increasingly drawn from a self-selecting pool, communicating through the internet.

This lends credence to the notion that al-Qaeda is the anarchist movement of today.  It follows in the patterns of the Baader-Meinhof, the Red Brigade, and the earlier anarchist movements of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  Contrary to the right-wing US motifs of the early 2000s (which thank God are soon about to end), the analogy for an Al-Qaeda is not to Nazism or Communism.

The attacker came from Nigeria, a country in the midst of a transition to modernity. The revolutionary cadre–as in European history–always come from the upper classes.  It comes from those who are both exposed to and then ultimately break from the modernization process (cf Osama bin Laden).

But unlike Communism or Fascism, these groups hold no states, have no armies, no alternate world economic regime.  They pop up in hollowed out states like Afghanistan, the tribal areas of Pakistan, or Yemen.  They can recruit from other parts of the world (e.g. Nigeria, even US) but in the end can only perform nihilistic attacks.

Or as Matthew Yglesias says (also holding to the anarchist analogy):

I really mean that analogy to be read in two directions. On the one hand, I think people drastically overestimate the extent of terrorism risks and the extent to which Muslim immigration to Europe is some unsolvable nightmare. But at the same time, I think part of what gets people confused here is a tendency to underestimate how severe the problems of the past seemed. Catholic (and Jewish) immigration to the United States really was, at the time, seen as a major dilemma involving the integration of ideological, religiously, and racially alien people. And people living before World War One really were living in an era marked by a frightening upsurge in anarchist violence, particularly a volume of major assassinations that would be unthinkable today.

In fact it might be argued that al-Qaeda the franchise is essentially being subsumed into regional/local insurgencies:  Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Somalia, Iraq, Algeria, and Yemen. On one hand, this gives al Qaeda-ism (if not Al Qaeda in Pakistan itself) another lease on life, but on the other continues their slide into being swallowed up into local insurgencies, limiting their political influence and eventually leading them down the road towards a kind of mafia-hood.

Either way, the future of al-Qaeda lies in Africa as Africa is the next great place of globalization (or modernization) and therefore (as Horkheimer and Adorno argued) of counter-modernization.  [Either there and/or into former Soviet republics in Central Asia.].  With what in the West is normally called Islamism representing something of the counter-modern force (or rather a more conservative modernist force) and al Qaeda being the extreme, violent, anarchist wing of Islamic counter-modernism.

The “War” was never against Civilizations but was always a war within a Civilization (Islam) as it becomes shaken up by the process of globalization.  The West can (and has been) drawn into that conflict–and through the Cold War inserted itself into that conflict and fomented it–but the conflict is fundamentally about one between modernists, counter-modernists, and traditionalists (largely being rubbed out) in the Islamic world.

Or according to Vali Nasr:

If the global values of “peace, security, democracy, freedom and human rights, moderation, and religious tolerance,” have not yet taken hold in Muslim lands, concludes Nasr, it is not because of the “fundamental nature of Islam,” but  because the “commercial class that must spearhead the process of propagating [those values] is still too small.” Helping this “critical middle” grow and come to “dominate their societies is the best way of making sure those global values will take deep root as Muslim values, paving the way to democracy.”

Critical to that evolution is taking place is an ability to live with ambiguous and developing situations, letting the internal and regional dynamics of a country play out (e.g. Iran).  The paradox will be that as these groups come to power many, if not most, of them will be (at least rhetorically) more anti-American, but their presence will overall be a better sign of geopolitical stability (including the US).  See Lebanon as an example.

–

Other thoughts as we approach the end of the year:

The Department of Homeland Security still sucks and has yet to learn anything about what is going on.

Yemen is fast becoming a mini-Pakistan with the Obama counterterrorism practice of air raids, training of local forces, pay offs, and all the rest.  Yemen has not yet reached (because the attack failed) counter-insurgency mode (a la Afghanistan).

It’s been a while since Chris and I jumped on Skype and rambled on for a while about the state of the world and associated topics, so we decided to remedy that fact last night. What follows is the first part (approximately 35 minutes) of our discussion about Obama’s decisions around Afghanistan, counter insurgency strategies, and American foreign policy vis-a-vis the Middle East more generally.

Part 2 will follow in a day or two so as to break up what are usually hour plus conversations into smaller, bite sized chunks. Check out the audio below the fold. [Read more →]

It’s striking, when you stop to think about it, how large an unspoken role symbolism plays in our understanding of the world and the ways in which we organize our lives. There are words, sounds, colours, images, clothing, objects, and even intonations that we don’t acknowledge on an almost second by second basis that trigger certain deeply held meanings for us and fundamentally inform how we wind up understanding a given experience. These symbols and the impact on our perception of things are so pervasive that one can stand side-by-side with a good friend, become exposed to the same set of variables and dynamics making up an experience, and interpret what happened in totally divergent ways.

That symbolism seems to operate on a myriad of levels and in an infinite number of contexts, from the tiniest of everyday interactions to the most expansive of meta-narratives. And more often than not, I think, we remain largely unconscious of this component of our perception and conception of the world. It was against the backdrop of that thinking that I happened to listen again to On Point’s November 16 podcast about the upcoming trial of Khalid Sheik Mohammed et al. and it was just that kind of thinking that has lead me to see the whole trial within the prism of a lose-lose matrix of outcomes. [Read more →]

The news is out on what appears to be the Obama plan on Afghanistan.  It’s obviously quite provisional at this point, but it seems to line up with what I thought would be the basic outline.

Obama will send 30,000 troops, has a (basic) end-date in sight (approximately three years later according to the piece I linked above), will ramp up training of the Afghan Army and Police, and wants to gradually transition over to an Afghan government.  Though it’s also likely that the US will keep some military advisors as well as air and logistical support in the country longer than that time-frame.  In short, Obama wants to try to achieve some victories against the insurgency in Afghanistan in the short term and then quickly transition the US out of the hot zone.

Unfortunately, things usually don’t turn out so neat and tidy in any war:

“We want to – as quickly as possible – transition the security of the Afghan people over to those national security forces in Afghanistan,” White House press secretary Robert Gibbs told ABC’s “Good Morning America.” “This can’t be nation-building. It can’t be an open-ended forever commitment.”

Here’s more information on the national army and police:

In Kabul, Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell, the new head of a U.S.-NATO command responsible for training and developing Afghan soldiers and police, said Tuesday that although the groundwork is being laid to expand the Afghan National Army beyond the current target of 134,000 troops, to be reached by Oct. 31, 2010, no fixed higher target is set.

There is a notional goal of eventually fielding 240,000 soldiers and 160,000 police, but Caldwell said that could change.

“Although that is a goal and where we think it could eventually go to, it’s not a hard, firm, fixed number,” he said in a telephone interview with The Associated Press.

He indicated that one reason for avoiding a hard-and-fast commitment to those higher numbers is the expected cost. So his orders are to reach the targets of 134,000 soldiers and 96,800 police by next October. He intends to hold annual reviews, beginning next spring or early summer, to determine whether the notional higher targets of 240,000 soldiers and 160,000 police – for a combined total of 400,000 by 2013 – are still the right goals for Afghanistan.

According to counterinsurgency doctrine, there needs to be roughly 500,000 counterinsurgents in Afghanistan. So 240,000 army plus 160,000 police equals 400,000 troops plus the NATO contingent (mostly US) of about 100,000 when this additional surge is factored in.  And there you have 500,000 counterinsurgents.

But counterinsurgents fighting from whom exactly?  Who is going to be there to follow-up with political and economic development after the fighting is over?  That question–the central question with respect to Afghanistan, in my mind–has yet to be persuasively answered.

To make that point clearer, I think a comparison with Iraq is in order.

If this policy is going to be likened to the Iraq surge (and it is certainly based in some measure on that event), then it’s worth reviewing exactly what happened in Iraq.  The surge–i.e. the addition of more troops into Iraq–was only a part of a larger process which could be broadly labeled counterinsurgency.

We need to recall what was going on in Iraq 2005-2007: [Read more →]

Rod Dreher:

On the other hand, it is also wrong to pretend that the Muslim religion had nothing to do with this massacre, that it is mere happenstance that this mass murderer’s crime was incidental to his Islamic faith. The US is in a war against Islamist terrorism. What Hasan did yesterday, on the evidence, was an act of Islamist terror. Period. When a devout Christian commits an act of violence against an abortion clinic, and does so pretty clearly in the name of his religion, it would be an act of stupidity, and possibly moral cowardice, to declare an investigation of his religious motive off-limits. And, in fact, we don’t do that, even as we are, or ought to be, aware that the overwhelming majority of Christians neither commit nor endorse such acts. Similarly, it is right and proper to have a critical discussion of the role Hasan’s religion played in this evil act, if only so we can identify Muslims like him in the future before they’re tempted to act on their convictions.                                 —(my emphasis)

Let’s look at that assertion I’ve highlighted.  The US is in a war against Islamist terrorism.

This, as the young people say, is the part where I break it down (word by word).

1) Terrorism

As has been said by many others, you can’t shouldn’t have a war against a tactic.  Terrorism is a tool and will horribly be deployed.  A country like the US particularly doesn’t want to declare itself in a war against a tactic whose technological and social trajectory is inevitably headed in the upward direction.  Otherwise you have definitionally set yourself up for failure.

Another reason I think the US (or any country for that matter) would not want to define itself in a war on terrorism is that it leads to the potential for ideological backlash.  e.g. I’ve never lived in a village where robotic aerial drones frequent and periodically drop bombs.  I assume however it is an act that would cause me to experience sheer terror.  If a country defines itself in a war on terror than it will admittedly set itself up for the charge of hypocrisy if it uses tactics that are seen to be (or really are to be fair) terror-inducing.

Also given Rod’s own analogy between the shooter and say a Christian abortion-doctor murderer, why is the US then at war against Islamist terrorism and not simply, as a civilized rule-based society, opposed to all criminal terrorist acts?  Does this individual’s despicable actions represent any real threat to the government of the United States?  Does any talk even of domestic home-grown Islamic extremism represent a substantially more serious threat to public order than say Salvadorean gangs, Mexican drug lords, and/or ultra ring-wing terrorist organizations?

I agree with Rod that when you have say anti-abortion terrorist activities by self-defined Christians claiming religion as their motivation, you should study their religion.  I agree with that proposition in the Ft. Hood case.  But why go from there to this act as part of some larger war?

Here’s terrorism expert Marc Sageman (h/t Yglesias) testifying before Congress this past October (p.2):

I excluded lone wolves, who were not physically or virtually connected to anyone in the global neo-jihad, for they often carry out their atrocities on the basis of delusion and mental disorder rather than for political reasons.

Sound relevant in the Ft. Hood case?

On to the other word I suppose to answer that one.

2) Islamist

Islamism is political view that seeks to create an Islamic state.  There are all kinds of problems with saying the US is in a war against Islamist terrorism. [Read more →]

For Part I here.

So I’m breaking my own rules in this second post (a little bit).  I said these posts would only be buitl around the interviews in this PBS documentary, but then Peter Bergen had to go and write a really important piece in TNR that merits some comment.

The central thrust of Bergen’s argument is:

“Today, at the leadership level, the Taliban and Al Qaeda function more or less as a single entity.”

Bergen here means the high leadership level of both the Afghan Taliban (or more properly Quetta Shura led by Mullah Omar) and The Tehrik-i-Pakistani, i.e. The Pakistani Taliban (now under the leadership of Hakimullah Mehsud).

The evidence he provides is substantial with Bergen arguing that al-Qaeda has essentially become a kind of embedded military trainer for The Taliban leadership.

Bergen then proceeds to knock down various counterarguments that for example al-Qaeda will move to Somalia or Yemen and thereby be as effective as in Pakistan-Afghanistan.  Or that the internet allows for more training or that urban centers in the West are grounds for the training of terrorist attacks.  As to the latter, the real operational training took place in Afghanistan and Pakistan, whatever logistical and coordinational plans were hatched in Western cities (e.g. Hamburg in 9/11).

Bergen is the Western world authority on al-Qaeda, so I think he makes a persuasive case that the leadership of the Taliban and al-Qaeda are in deep symbiosis.

However there is this point:

And it is also true that Taliban foot soldiers today are fighting for any number of reasons–ranging from cash payments, to tribal opposition to the government, to a hatred of foreigners.

This leaves a potential opening for what in COIN terminology is called separating the reconcilables and the irreconcilables.  The reconcilables being drawn from the “foot soldier” ranks, the irreconcilables being the top layer leadership.

Now reconciliation to what?  And here I think Bergen near the end of the article leaves something to be desired. [Read more →]

Jamelle makes some persuasive points in this post on Afghanistan–arguing that the administration and its supporters have yet to make a solid case that the war is in the US interests.  As he says, the case is still “up in the air.”

I think on that specific point he’s right.  Attempting to build a nation-state in Afghanistan will not destroy the threat of al-Qaeda (especially if AQ is hiding in Pakistan and as appears likely heading either to Yemen and the Horn of Africa and/or northward into Central Asia).

But I think he goes too far in the other direction with this point:

There’s not much evidence to suggest that a stable government in Afghanistan will lead to a lower overall incidence of terrorism.  Of the major terrorist attacks (against Western targets) since 9/11, the two largest – the March 2004 attack in Spain and the July 2005 attack in Britain – were planned and executed within the respective countries.  Indeed, the same is true of 9/11. What’s more, and as Matt Yglesias has repeatedly noted, the terrorist attacks that we’re really worried about – nuclear, chemical or biological attacks – are unlikely to be carried out by terrorist groups located in Afghanistan, or even Pakistan for that matter.  In all likelihood, those plots will be developed and carried out by terrorists within the targeted country.

The Spainish and British cases (even 9/11 for that matter) are a little more complicated in terms of geographic influence/causation.  For example, the idea of the plot for 9/11 was thought up by Khaled Sheik Mohammed.  Not in Germany nor in the US.  The Madrid attacks were largely funded by selling hash and ecstasy on the Spanish nightclub scene (which in Barcelona in particular has a very global makeup).  The hash largely coming from Morocco.

And the British attacks occurred through the pipeline of Pakistani extremism.

In other words, while the standard notion that attacks emanate from one point in the world–i.e. a failed state like Afghanistan–and therefore we need to go and create stable nation-states where there are failed states is really flawed, the opposite is not therefore true. Namely that terrorist attacks only perpetuate within the host countries.

Terrorism is much more like (or is) a black market criminal enterprise.  As such it is global, like all corporations across the planet.  The concept of “citizenship” or which nation-state is the site of the issue is largely a false frame in this age.  As Dan Drezner said, All Politics is Global.  Terrorism included.

I’m playing devil’s advocate here, as I’m very skeptical (as I’ve said before) of increasing troop presence in Afghanistan, but the alternative of assuming that all interventions only make situations worse (which I’m not saying is Jamelle’s position to be clear) is no good in my mind either.

We need some framework for this muddy in between.  Which is why I was so pleased to read Dr. Thomas Rid’s piece in The Atlanticist.  I recommend the post in full.  It’s very good.

He lists ten points to consider in an analysis of what to do re: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the larger operation against terrorism.  Those ten points include insights from both camps–the Afghanistan is central to fighting al-Qaeda/US interests and those who oppose that view.  [Read more →]

I realize I’m a little behind on this book (it came out last year), but my wife bought it for herself, started it and then put it down, and since Pakistan is one of the subjects I follow very closely, I thought I’d give it a go.

Bhutto is in the fuzzy parlance of our world a religious moderate.  Or she is both a fervently believing Muslim and someone who abides by the hallmarks of the modern world:  gender equity; non-tyrannical forms of governance (typically expressed through democratic and parliamentary mechanisms); co-existence and mutual connection both within a religious body (ecumenism) as well as between various religious groupings (inter-religious dialogue) as well as with those who are not religiously practicing/believing; belief in progress through wise-judicious application of scientific critical rationality and technological advance, etc. etc.

Her intended audience is a Westerner whose experience of the “Muslim world” is the hallmark one of swarthy, masked villainous characters, black robed  and faced obscured huddling women, and/or flag burning scream fests.  To that audience she (in the first chapter) clearly lays out her co-existing and non-problematic Western educated self, Pakistani self, and Muslim self.  As a woman. It’s effective on that front and I recommend it if anyone is looking for some basic background on these issues.

Of course as a religious liberal Bhutto time and time again elides her interpretive tradition with Islam as “it really is.”  This move of course is to parry and thrust against the fundamentalists she is out to deconstruct since they claim their understanding of Islam is in fact no understanding of Islam at all but rather how it really is.  The Truth, capital T.

I realize why she commits that error; I realize that she basically has to commit that error.  But it’s still an error.  It’s (partially) dishonest to not self-disclose in a religious debate that one’s view is in fact a view and not the view.  Of course when the other side (the fundamentalists) won’t make such an admission then for the religious liberals to do so can leave them vulnerable.

The one argument she makes I think very well is the following. [Read more →]

Unfortunately the Obama administration has been falling for this one, putting pressure on the weak civilian government to initiate a massive heavy campaign in the Swat valley, leaving up to a million and a half (you read that correctly) refugees.

One of the chief counsels on this topic to the administration comes from Bruce Riedel from the Saban Center.  He worked on a brief for the President that was part of Obama’s assessment of his Af-Pak (or is it Pak-Af?) policy.  Here’s a summary of his findings via the Brookings Website:

Just before her murder in December 2007 former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto said, “I now think Al Qaeda can be marching on Islamabad in two to four years.” Today her prophecy seems all too real.

Al Qaeda’s allies in Pakistan, the Taliban, Lashkar e Tayyba, and other extreme jihadists, are becoming increasingly powerful. They are no longer confined to the tribal belt along the Afghan border but have built strong bases of support in the nation’s heartland, the Punjab, and in the major cities. The mayor of Karachi, a mega city of 18 million, tells me the Taliban alliance is now threatening to take over his city, the country’s only major port and NATO’s logistical supply line for the war in Afghanistan. A jihadist state in Pakistan is neither imminent nor inevitable, it may not be likely, but it is a real possibility.

al-Qaeda marching on Islamabad?  I don’t mean to speak ill of the (tragically) dead here, but what the hell does that even mean?  al-Qaeda is after some Caliphate that will never exist.  In Reza Aslan’s terms they are cosmic warriors.  They hate the state which is to them a sign of Western imperalism. All they can do is destroy.  They are in the truest sense of the word nihilists.  al-Qaeda is dangerous insofar as they can wreck death and destruction; they are not dangerous insofar as their political ideology has no ability ever to be made real.

Now the other groups–what the administration is now calling the terrorist/extremist syndicate–that Reidel mentions some of whom are after a governance.  e.g. Afghanistani and Pakistani Tablian both.  Both again recall that during the Afghan Taliban period of rule, they did not heavily govern as such but rather sought to impose a moral (dys)utopian vision on the country.  Now they are more like a mafia, in which case syndicate is a better term, but one that works against the grain of the US’ own policy in the region.  [i.e. You usually don't send aerial bombardments and tanks against the Cosa Nostra].

So what is this jihadist state Reidel is talking about?

As Peter Bergen (h/t Juan Cole) points out that it is quite absurd to imagine the Taliban or any such group frontally winning a conventional war against the Pakistani military.  The Pakistani military as the analysts all say is still too built around conventional war (against India) to fight counterinsurgency.  Which is why the Taliban & related groups are never on Allah’s Green earth going to fight them in that manner. Bergen also correctly points out that the Pakistani electorate by and large has rejected politically extreme parties.

But even as sane a commentary (and one from a man who knows the region like few Westerners on the planet) still focuses on this all or nothing, the state is everything framework.  There still needs to be some learning about the post-Cold War world.  The issue is not taking over a state but rather creating a statelet within a hollowed out state from which to operate.

So a better question:  Could Pakistan become hollowed out?  Hollowed is relegated basically to the capital and formally in charge though practically not so much.

A few scenarios that could initiate such a sequence:

A) Regionalism and the breakup of the state along the example of Yugoslavia (with Balochistan maybe first to go).  Bergen’s conclusion here is extremely relevant:

A new Pakistan leader will have to emerge who has the courage to say something like the following: “I have a plan. It is a Pakistani plan and not an American plan. Our main enemy is no longer India; if we go to war again, we may well destroy each other with our nuclear weapons. Our new enemy is the militants claiming to act for Islam in our midst. They do not represent the Pakistan that our great founder, Ali Jinnah, envisioned; a country for Muslims living in peace, not an ideologically Islamist state. We will make no peace deals with the Taliban again. Every time we have done such a deal the Taliban have used it as a prelude to steal more of our land and impose their brutal rule on more of our citizens. We will task and train our military for an effective campaign against the militants, and we will wipe them off our lands.”

i.e. A politician who can articulate the purpose of Pakistan in the 21st century.  A state that would truly become one of the powers that be in the world that its deficiencies currently prevent it from being.  e.g. Feckless, corrupt civilian leadership, the history of the ISI in bed with terrorist elements, the aristocratic feudal plutocracy, and its insane continued focus (near paranoia at points) on India.  The US policy does not help but verify (though not intentionally) the increasing conspiracy theory among Pakistanis that the US is coming to carve the country up.  I’m not sure what the possibility for this occurring is.  Minus someone stepping up and articulating the kind of vision Bergen outlines for the country, then this scenario grows more likely (though by no means inevitable) overtime.  Though I think for now it’s still fairly remote.

B) While Reidel acts as if the spread of the extremists is going to lead to some Pakistani jihadi state, what it means in actuality is the possibility of more and more deadly urban terror in Pakistan.  Particularly as a retaliation to the current assault in Swat.  Recall the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the attack on the Marriott Hotel, as well as extended bombings to the Indian embassy in Kabul and the horrible attacks in Mumbai. The jihadis don’t need (or I think even want to) take over the state.  They need to inflict psychological (4th Gen Warfare) damage on the populace, with the fear paralyzing decision-making and information processing thereby breaking the OODA loop between gov’t/ military and getting them to back off, to create their own fiefdom.  Presumably the truce that fell through was exactly this movement.  We will see if this new offensive can really break some of the cross-country networks.  The jury is out on this one.

So if by on the brink is meant a la Reidel on the brink of becoming a jihadi state, then no.  Bergen and Cole are right on this point.  The military, the populace, assorted media/judicial elements are too strong for that to occur.  Basing policy on such a flawed read of the situation will not lead anywhere good seems to me.  The real danger is a weakning of the state, leading to anarchic pockets of criminality and potentially exported terror.  This possibility is real in Pakistan’s case.