A dialogue on Afghanistan worth watching.

I first read The New American Militarism a few years ago for a class in college. Then came Andrew Bacevich’s latest book, The Limits of Power, which I picked up just as soon as it arrived at my local library. As far as foreign policy scholarship is concerned, Bacevich gives voice to a serious and often overlooked school of thought that – in the wake of the disaster we colloquially refer to as the Bush Administration’s foreign policy – deserves a respectful and serious hearing.

In the case of Afghanistan, however, I think Bacevich is wrong. His latest article for Commonweal is a stirring indictment of our conduct and strategic goals in the region, and I’m extremely wary of criticizing someone whose work I hold in such high regard. But at the risk of sounding like Jacob Weisberg (stop me if you’ve heard this one before), I do believe that certain segments of the non-interventionist Right have allowed the Iraq War and a general  aversion to foreign intervention unduly prejudice their views on Afghanistan. Here’s why:

Given our history of flooding the country with arms, equipment and military training, I’m inclined to believe that the United States does have a moral obligation to help restore order in Afghanistan. I don’t think this entails imposing a particular system of governance on the country. I am emphatically in favor of scaling back our strategic objectives to providing basic security and ensuring certain minimal standards of administrative competence. But washing our hands and walking away strikes me as irresponsible and callous, particularly when our actions have contributed to so much turmoil in the region.

Bacevich’s response to the conflict’s moral dimension is almost dismissive. Yes, I suppose we also have an obligation to help Mexico weather its own bout of internal conflict. That’s why I’m in favor of reforming our drug policy. But fulfilling our moral obligations elsewhere and securing a minimal standard of internal stability for a country wracked by violence for much of the past three decades are not mutually irreconcilable goals. Attempting to demonstrate the absurdity of our mission in Afghanistan by comparing it to the plight of our southern neighbor is a non-sequitur – Mexico is not a failed state, and the same prescriptions that apply to a wild and lawless country in Asia have little relevance south of the border.

There’s also some tension between non-interventionists’ laudable concern for avoiding further civilian casaulties at the hands of the U.S. military and their almost cavalier attitude towards the consequences of withdrawal. Bacevich, for example, is in favor of “precision, punitive strikes” to prevent Al Qaeda from reconstituting after we leave. Presumably he refers to the same aerial strikes that have wreaked so much havoc in Pakistan over the past few years. We now know that increased reliance on air power risks greater civilian casualties – does anyone seriously believe that these ‘punitive strikes’ will become more precise post-withdrawal? Or are we in danger of endorsing a ‘risk-management’ strategy that trades the exposure of U.S. troops for even more civilian deaths?

Finally, the pragmatic case for staying. Bacevich seems to endorse some variant of this, acknowledging the need to prevent Al Qaeda from reforming through precision air-strikes and tribal alliances. So our mission becomes a question of means, not ends, and I’m inclined to think that committing a significant peacekeeping force for internal stability is the most appropriate mechanism for achieving these goals. Dramatically scaling back our ambitions in the region would be a welcome development, but I’m loath to abandon Afghanistan entirely to punitive air-strikes, tribal bandits, a Taliban resurgence, and whatever brave NGOs manage to stay the course.

Chris and I pick up where Freddie and James left off, yakking about American foreign policy; Obama and his magic mirror trick; Bush; the future of interventionism (or lack thereof as the case may be); articulating a forward looking, non-reactive, positively defined foreign policy in a post-cold war world; our favourite foreign policy guru Thomas Barnett, why we love him and why when you love someone you have to set them free; the limits of superpowerdome; the relationship between economics and foreign policy; cultivating a greater American modesty; and working towards a mutually invested and appreciative, multipolar, dynamic geo-political stability. [Read more →]

Deeper minds than mine are taking on the imperialism question around the b’sphere–Freddie provides not only a deft human touch to the question but also all the links you’ll need on the subject.

This is not a criticism of the writers involved (Millman, Poulos, Larison)–rather it’s my lack of processing capacity on this one–but as I discussed in my Great Powers reviews, the notion of these discussions taking place minus a corresponding technological-economic discussion I find too abstract.  Again all players make some heavy duty philosophical points, worth reading. So I would like to add these thoughts more as another point of view into the mix than one that takes sides or trump the others.

e.g. A (the core?) question in this debate is whether a republic can survive the expansion of itself domestically and/or internationally.

This question brings to mind my other favorite foreign policy text Bounding Power by Daniel Deudney.  [The conversation comes somewhat full circle as I had written a review of that book that James P. was going to edit for Culture11 before its demise].  A very positive review of the work by John Ikenberry here.

Deudney refers to himself as a liberal (i.e. non-Marxist) historical materialist. That puts him in a very similar trajectory to a Barnett, though Deudney puts more emphasis on government and its philosophical platforms/commitments.  In Deudney’s understanding there are two fundamental questions (“problematiques”):  the question of violence/security and the question of scope (not necessarily size) of government.

He then creates a grid based on these two questions.  States/entities that can not control violence become anarchic.  A number of states pass this threshold moving onto the second question: how will the government be formed that will prevent said violence.

Deudney says basically one of two options to this second question:  hierarchical (i.e. authoritarian, imperial) and republican (small ‘r’).

DD then correlates eras of technological history across the grid which creates levels/layers of this twofold phenomena.  [I'm not doing him justice, it's a totally brilliant work].

e.g. Continental sized government that ends internal anarchic violence but is hierarchical and not republican think Napoleonic Europe  versus the republican form of England.  [Though to be fair, England has its own hierarchical governance  abroad and arguably the US since WWII has as well].

The emergent levels refer to the reach/scope of power than can be exercised.  Bounding Power as a title refers to his dual sense of the move of history and his political aim:  Power is bounding across the planet on one hand.  On the other, we seek to bound power as in bind it (the republican option at any level of scope).  The ability of the power to be bounding is of course in large (though not total) part a technological question. [Read more →]

Mark and I had the opportunity to chatter a bit last night with Pomocon James Poulos on the issue of torture, where things currently stand and what some possible paths forward might look like. It was a pretty lively discussion, check out the audio below: [Read more →]