The trouble with folks like Mark Steyn is that all their clamor about Europe being swept away in a tide of hostile immigrants obscures the very real problem of assimilating new arrivals. Steyn, for example, is absolutely correct that criminalizing Geert Wilders’ moronic proposal to ban the Koran is antithetical to the idea of a free society. But I can’t help thinking that these warnings would be a lot more credible if Steyn and his ilk hadn’t spent so much time making wrong-headed predictions about Europe’s imminent Islamist takeover.

As for Wilders, I do hope our European cousins realize that manufacturing free speech martyrs is not a very effective way to marginalize extremists. Wilders’ substantive views are so radical they’re almost self-refuting – strip away the persecution complex and vague allusions to “defending free speech” and the guy’s platform is proto-fascistic (Alex Massie’s apt distillation: “In other words, the only way to save the western liberal tradition is to kill it”).  Would Wilders survive without free publicity from being banned in Britain and his absurd prosecution in The Netherlands? I doubt it, if only because he would no longer be able to posture as some heroic protector of free speech. Instead, he’d be stuck explaining how banning religious texts is consistent with European liberty.

Via Will Wilson and MR, here’s an interesting paper on the Protestant work ethic:

Many theories, most famously Max Weber’s essay on the ‘Protestant ethic,’ have hypothesized that Protestantism should have favored economic development. With their considerable religious heterogeneity and stability of denominational affiliations until the 19th century, the German Lands of the Holy Roman Empire present an ideal testing ground for this hypothesis. Using population figures in a dataset comprising 276 cities in the years 1300-1900, I find no effects of Protestantism on economic growth.

Assuming these findings are correct, I think Weber’s hypothesis is a good example of our tendency to mistakenly credit superficial factors for inciting major events like Northern Europe’s economic take-off. Weber’s theory always sounded vaguely plausible – “Protestantism, by stressing individual freedom and responsibility toward God, dispensed with the Church hierarchy and thus encouraged Protestants to become more flexible and open toward new ideas” (p. 6) – and had the added benefit of lending a scientific veneer to mid-century assumptions about the desirability of Protestant Northern European culture. This type of analysis has a long provenance, from claims about the innate superiority of Anglo-Saxon nations to contemporary theories about Europe’s unique “engineering culture,” but I think the fundamental problem here is mistaking a symptom of social change or some factor that happens to coincide with social change (in this case, the Protestant Reformation) for the underlying causes of success.

This line of analysis also reminds me of Victor Davis Hanson’s view of Western exceptionalism, in which a Luther or an Edison or a Machiavelli were drivers of European ascendancy rise rather than products of a new socio-economic environment. Obviously, there’s a feedback effect at work insofar as dynamic individuals exacerbate or emphasize the conditions that gave rise to their success, but I think notable historical figures or significant historical developments can’t really be separated from their broader political and social context.

At the risk of sounding like a nutty determinist, this is why I found Steven Davies’ recent essay at Cato Unbound so persuasive. By identifying Europe’s political fragmentation as the critical factor behind the rise of the Modern West, Davies is able to isolate a plausible “first cause” for a series of dramatic social changes – capitalism, secularism, modernity etc. – we now associate with European exceptionalism. This structural explanation strikes me as a lot more comprehensive (and satisfying) than pointing to a few outstanding individuals or a religious event as the driving factor behind social and political change.

UPDATE: Ah, the perils of late night blogging. Commenter Koz correctly notes that Hanson’s thesis is a bit more nuanced that I give him credit for. Hanson ties European success to broader trends within Western culture, not just the achievements of a few outstanding figures. Again, I think this mistakes a proximate cause of Europe’s ascendancy for the underlying force(s) behind Western exceptionalism, but I should have been more careful with my characterization.

Interestingly enough, the author Hanson is criticizing – Jared Diamond – also suggests that geographic/political fragmentation helped create the necessary preconditions for European ascendancy.

An essential post from Bartlett on the trivial differences between Europe and the United States. Speaking as someone who managed to survive growing up on that benighted continent,  it’s high time we move beyond gratuitously bashing our closest political and cultural cousins. I’m not in favor of replicating the European social model here in the United States, but appropriating its best features sounds like a pretty good idea.

Br. Will links to an interesting review of Christopher Caldwell’s new book Reflections on the Revolution in Europe by Michelle Goldberg.

Will notes that he thinks there is cause for real concern–without going into as he calls it (correctly) Steynian hysterics–concerning Muslim immigration patterns in Europe.  An analysis that is not the fears of Eurabia or Daniel Pipes psychosis (edit: psychosis there is redundant) about Western Europe being taken over by a Taliban-like or Saudi-esque government nor yet the inability to discuss any difficult/challenging issues for fear of being called a racist.

Goldberg claims that Caldwell’s book fits this third option:  serious not hysterical; focused on European issues and not (as Goldberg correctly points out) filled with so much attacks on domestic liberals in the US culture war like the Mark Steyns, Pipes, and so forth are.

Caldwell’s book sounds like it will be worth the read.  Another book I would recommend in this vein is Londonistan.  That book points out that there are “no go” neighborhoods for white Europeans, even police in some cases, in certain immigrant dominated neighborhoods in Europe.  My sense from US history is that it’s not all that different from similar phenomena in urban ghetto existence (or 19th century Italian Mafia controlled neighborhoods, or Irish mob controlled areas).  It’s a worrisome trend but not unknown in the Western world.

And there are serious issues at play.  One of which Will mentions is that European history and culture is not built around a history of immigrants and assimilation.  At least not since the coming of the Vikings and Gothic tribes.  To be defined as European, to be accepted as truly European, means being descended from Europeans.

In the US, conversely, identity is largely (though certainly not entirely) built around common adherence to the American dream:  suburbs, BBQ grills, 2.3 children, white picket fence, dog/cat, capitalism, belief in American exceptionalism, etc.  You can be brown, black, white, whatever and fit that mold and be recognizably American.  Of course there is still among some a kind of White American Protestantism as “real” America, largely on display of late in a retrograde backlash (or is it blacklash?) movement, showing that it realizes its dominance is a thing of yesteryear.

Not the same in Europe.  Take the example of Sarkozy in France.  He argues strenuously that Christianity is part of European identity, yet he never goes to church, I would bet money doesn’t believe in anything approaching God, is a serial divorcee, and at the same time is a bulwark of the French secular religion of laicite:  with his push to ban Muslim headscarves.

Third generation born and raised in Germany Germans of Turkish descent are described by the “real” Germans (i.e. white Germans) as Turks. For all the US right-winger shots at hyphenated identities, European immigration of Muslim Europeans would go a whole lot faster if there was a concept like Turkic-Germans.  In Europe, very broadly speaking, it’s like they have the worst of multiculturalism.  They have the negative side of multiculturalism: i.e. treating all cultures as these homogeneous monolithic wholes altogether separated from other monolithic homogeneous cultural wholes, none of which can be criticized.  They don’t have the flip or positive side of multiculturalism:  the hyphenated identities allow for a sense of oneness (e.g. American) while allowing people to live out that unity through a number of various diverse formations (e.g. African America, Asian American, Latino America, and really we should say White Americans).

With all that said–and again not minimizing real issues involved here–some perspective is in order, particularly on demographics and immigration numbers.  This link from the Wilson Center on a new study they conducted is a real tonic in this regard. [Read more →]

Without lapsing into Steynian hysteria, I think there are real concerns about the growing population of alienated, socially immobile Muslim immigrants in Europe. In that vein, Michelle Goldberg’s review of Reflections on the Revolution in Europe is worth a read, if only because it’s one of the few time I’ve seen a liberal acknowledge the problems associated with large-scale Muslim immigration.

I am, however, generally opposed to anti-immigrant hysterics, so I think it’s worth considering the possibility that Europe’s Islamic population will not remain poor, culturally alienated, and economically stagnant. In general, societies that experience an influx of immigrants get better at assimilating newcomers over time. When I lived in Helsinki, for example, the Finnish government adopted a generous asylum policy towards Somali refugees. This resulted in a lot of tension between native-born Finns and the Somalis, as neither group had a lot of experience with cultural assimilation. Finnish newspaper cartoons would lapse into what most Americans would describe as racist tropes, drawing Somalian immigrants with cartoonishly big lips, gleaming white teeth, and massive ears. A more mundane example of Finnish-Somali culture clash is the wrapper of a popular licorice candy:

Does this mean that all Finns are incorrigible racists? I suppose it’s possible, but this is the same country that adopted a Somali-friendly immigration policy in the first place. The cartoons could speak to a disparity between elite and popular opinion, but a more banal explanation is that societies with few immigrants are generally bad (at least at first) at immigrant assimilation. Americans are pretty attuned to racial stereotypes because we live and work in a racially diverse climate; most Finns, on the other hand, were blissfully unaware that something as silly as a candy wrapper could be construed as offensive. As Finland’s Somali population becomes more politically and economically visible, however, this will probably change, in much the same way the United States has gradually become more comfortable with a diverse cultural landscape. Assimilation is a difficult process, and the emergence of large, economically-depressed Muslim minorities poses a real challenge to Europe, but I think we should consider the possibility that inter-ethnic tensions will decline as Europeans acclimate themselves to a genuinely multicultural future.

Victor Davis Hanson is visiting Europe. More precisely, Italy and Greece. Several profound insights into the nature of continental society follow:

After concluding another 16 days in Europe. I am again reminded how different their form of socialism  is, and yet how closely it resembles the model that Obama seeks for America. The vast majority of citizens lives in apartments, even in smaller towns and villages. Cars are tiny. Prices are higher than in the states; income is lower (The government taxes you to pay for things like “free” college, so you won’t have much to spend on antisocial things like your Wal-Mart plastic Christmas Tree or your second K-Mart plasma TV.)

Mass transit is frequent and cheap,  but often crowded and occasionally unpleasant. The stifled desire to acquire something—large house, car, deposit account—is of course not quite destroyed by socialism, but rather is channeled into a sort of cynicism and anger, often leading to a hedonism of few children, late and long meals, and disco hours until the early morning. The number of Gucci like stores selling overpriced label junk like 200 Euro eye-glass frames and 1000 Euro leather bags to socialists is quite amazing.

Clearly, this reflects Hanson’s experience in Greece and Italy, not “Europe.” And while Hanson’s observations are undoubtedly filtered through his own ideological lens, a lot of what he says rings true: unlike their Northern counterparts, Greece and Italy have always been on continent’s political and economic periphery. Not too long ago, Athens was being run by a military junta. Silvio Berlusconi’s checkered career is proof enough of Italy’s retrograde political culture. Taking either country as emblematic of Europe would be like using Mississippi as a prime example of the American economic and social model. Which is to say, other factors are at work here.

Cherry-picking favorable examples is a time-honored political tactic, which is why the Left is always talking about the dynamism of the Scandinavian economies – Nokia! Erickson! – or the fact that Denmark regularly tops Freedom House’s economic rankings. The bog-standard conservative rejoinder – something I happen to agree with – is that the political outcomes of small, culturally homogeneous European countries don’t necessarily track with the United States’ experience. It also follows that the defects of Greece and Italy aren’t much of a roadmap for liberalism in the Age of Obama.

Denmark and Finland do not vindicate progressive policy any more than Greece and Italy prove its ruinous consequences. The United States is a different country, and the impact of our policy choices tend to differ dramatically from the experience of even our closest political cousins. Hanson’s insights into the nature of “European” society notwithstanding, it would be better for all of us if we shied away from facile country-to-country comparisons.

Matt Yglesias points us to this chart, which is depressing enough on its own:

Then, both he and Kevin Drum, go on to point out that job losses are likely going to be long-term.

Drum writes:

I don’t want to push this theme too far because I haven’t yet done the work to really get a reliable sense of what’s going on.  But I wonder, when this recession is finally over, if we’re going to find ourselves in a European-esque mode with a large and growing population that’s almost continually unemployed or, at best, underemployed.

I posed this question to some friends the other night over beers: If immigration restrictions between the U.S. and the E.U. were lifted entirely, what would happen? [Read more →]

Will Wilkinson has a fascinating post on whether some basic level of material well-being should be considered a human right. My gut response is that while we have some  moral obligation to alleviate poverty, this obligation is too conditional (welfare programs are dependent on outside factors like cumulative wealth) to be considered on with par protecting freedom of speech or freedom of assembly.

Having said that, I find it surprisingly easy to imagine a world where freedom from poverty becomes a human right, at least in some countries. Wilkinson isn’t a big fan of nation states, and I’m not sure his universalist framework allows for codifying an individual right to basic material well-being. But if you think of rights as derived from the traditions of discrete political communities (nation states, for example), it becomes easier to imagine how freedom from poverty could gradually become something akin to freedom of speech.

The European Union, for example, recognizes the right to an education, the right of the elderly to age with dignity, and the right to healthcare. These things aren’t traditionally thought of as inviolable rights, but they seem to reflect some fairly widespread assumptions about what European citizens are entitled to, and one can easily identify formal and informal antecedents to these rights in individual states’ constitutions and norms of governance.

Our right to free speech wasn’t formally codified until we wrote it down, but its political history predates the Constitution by centuries. European ‘welfare’ rights developed under similar circumstances – gradually acquiring legitimacy as countries’ political and social institutions evolved after World War II. Is their right to healthcare or education any less real than our right to free speech? Maybe the European Constitution needs a few more decades (centuries?) of political seasoning before it can lay claim to a similar reservoir of cultural legitimacy, but I find it surprisingly easy to accept the idea of education, healthcare, and yes, freedom from poverty as “rights” in a European context.

UPDATE: I should add that Wilkinson’s post was inspired by this entry from William Easterly, whose excellent book should be required reading for anyone interested in Third World poverty. Other authors are busy popularizing his thesis – I imagine NRO is willing to interview this woman because, unlike Easterly, she doesn’t raise uncomfortable questions about Western imperialism – but his book is the best of the lot.

After an unbearably over-hyped build-up, Barcelona’s 2-0 victory over Manchester United was pretty darn anti-climactic. Adding insult to injury, the match forced casual or otherwise unaffiliated fans to choose the lesser of two (great) evils. Barcelona has gradually become the Iberian equivalent of Steinbrenner’s Yankees, and not since the Vandals crossed the Pyrenees has a side so thoroughly ravaged Spain. Lead by the grim Scott Sir Alex Ferguson and flopper-in-chief Cristiano Ronaldo, Manchester United isn’t much better, though at least the Premiership remains a bit more competitive than its Spanish counterpart.

The triumph of unbridled capitalism over European football has left the continent’s leagues incredibly top-heavy, with a few elite clubs absolutely dominating the rest of the competition. Not only has this contributed to the downfall of many storied older franchises (Newcastle United was just exiled from the Premiership, which would be roughly equivalent to the New York Knicks getting sent to the D-league after a few rough seasons), but any nouveau riche competitor can now buy its way into contention (I’m looking at you, Manchester City).

As recently as ten or fifteen years ago, Western Europe’s national leagues enjoyed a certain amount of parity. Top players like Zinedine Zidane or Jürgen Klinsmann could (and would) play a substantial portion of their careers in their respective national leagues without suffering the indignity of competing in a professional backwater. Now, however, the financial lure of big contracts from the Premiership or the Spanish or Italian leagues have hollowed out many of the older powerhouses, and the result has left the sport much worse for wear. The once-proud Dutch, German and French national leagues are shadows of their former selves. A few global franchises have created a football oligarchy.

Am I exaggerating for effect? Absolutely. But I think it’s undeniable that European football has become a lot more top-heavy over the past several years, and I lament the fact that so many older clubs are being left behind. I don’t have an answer to soccer’s current woes, but the sport’s plight does raise a few interesting questions.

First, has any European league seriously considered instituting a salary cap? It would be nice, for once, to find a Premiership champion outside the “Big Four”. However, I don’t know if the top clubs would agree to a salary cap, and I also suspect that any proposal would have to overcome a collective action problem. Namely, if one national league implements a limit on total compensation, elite players would still be able to skip across the border to command top dollar. As the de facto headquarters of (American) football, baseball and basketball, the United States’ domestic leagues have never faced a similar problem when structuring players’ salaries (though that may be changing).

Second, are European soccer analysts developing their own brand of sabermetrics? The logical response to being grossly outspent by one’s competitors would be to maximize resources through better player evaluation, which is precisely what small-market baseball franchises have done over the past several years. Soccer is presumably more difficult to analyze because unlike baseball, play can’t be broken down into discrete individual events. Despite facing a similar problem, basketball stat gurus seem to be catching up, so I wonder if soccer is far behind.

I admit I’ve drifted away from the beautiful game of late, so perhaps I’m simply ignorant of recent football-related developments. Anyone out there got answers for me?

Via Reason, here’s an interesting article on Europe and the United States’ cultural and political commonalities. Worth keeping in mind amid all the talk of “Euro-socialism” and “Islamification.”

So it looks as though Spain is opening formal criminal inquiries into alleged war crimes surrounding the use of torture by the Bush administration.  Judge Baltasar Garzón is involved in the investigation, the same guy who prosecuted Augusto Pinochet, the Chilean dictator propped up for years by the CIA.  So perhaps there’s something “full-circle” about this.  It’s not as though the Bush Administration is alone amongst the past dozen or so Presidents who abused their authority in order to spread American power across the globe.  From Kennedy to Nixon to Bill Clinton these sorts of soft-crimes, coups, and shadowy military support of tyrants and rebels alike has been the modus operandi for the Executive Branch.  George W. Bush just took it one step further, and it’s hard to know how other Presidents would have reacted post-9/11, but there is no question in my mind that few would have taken it so far as Bush did, and the main reason I believe that is because of the insidious influence of Cheney on White House policy over the past eight years.

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One thing that has long baffled me has been the idea on the American Right that Europe is some kind of socialist hell-hole that borders on Communist.  The thrust of the argument always seems to be that European government is so large and intrusive, and it public mores so lacking and dare I say nihilistic that it is something akin to Hell on Earth.  Mark Steyn, not surprisingly, expresses this attitude fairly succinctly, writing:

Europeanism is like Communism: the less time you’ve spent living it in practice the better disposed you are to it in theory. In the same way, few of those Americans who want to introduce Canadian-style health care to the U.S. have ever had surgery at the Royal Victoria. Indeed, America is full of immigrants whose hostility to Euro-Canadian public policy derives explicitly from their prolonged exposure to it.

Of course, the definition of “Europeanism” is ill-defined.  So far as I can tell, it’s a reference to a government with a large social welfare system combined with a secularized social policy.  The assumption, which is largely based on a false equivalency that social safety nets = socialism = Road to Serfdom and that United States = World’s Only Bastion of Free Market Capitalism = World’s Only Free Country, is that these “Europeanist” policies make Europe an absolute hell-hole. 

Despite my deep love of the free market, I’ve always found this chain of thought to be utterly absurd.  For starters, the idea that Europe is some kind of hell-hole at all doesn’t seem to line up with reality, as Alex Massie points out:

Never mind that, according to the most recent World Values Survey, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Switzerland, Austria, Malta, Luxembourg, Sweden each reported higher levels of happiness and “life satisfaction” than the United States. That isn’t to say that the US is unhappy, merely that there is more than one route to happiness. And that’s the point: europe (however broadly defined) and the United States are each remarkable success stories permitting a greater percentage of the population than at any point in history has the opportunity to make their own choices about how to lead their lives.

But there’s more to it than this.  If “Europeanism” really is that much of a restraint on freedom, one would expect that European nations would have exceedingly tightly restricted economies, with comparatively little economic liberty.  Thankfully, that lunatic left-wing think tank the Heritage Foundation has long compiled a statistical ranking of economic freedoms around the world. 

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