I was out for drinks with friends and Israel came up in the conversation.  A friend of mine said that she’d heard somewhere – Fox maybe? – that if you likened Gaza to a Nazi concentration camp you were an anti-Semite, and isn’t that ridiculous?  Can’t we criticize the Israeli government’s policy without being anti-Semitic?

To which, of course, the answer is unequivocally yes. Of course we can (and should) criticize the bad policies of any government, and especially those governments which have close ties to our own.  But what jumped out at me at this point was not the persistent frustration of being poorly labeled by the pro-Israel right (and left) – it was the bad analogy.  It’s simply a bad analogy to compare Israelis (or Zionists) to Nazis.  And along with being a bad analogy, it’s just in poor taste to call Gaza a concentration camp.

Now, I say this for a number of reasons.  First, it gets us nowhere.  In fact, calling the Jewish people Nazi’s is kind of like calling all critics of Israel anti-Semites.  It doesn’t further the debate, it shuts the debate down.  Comparing Gaza to a concentration camp is similarly ineffectual.  Gaza is in bad shape.  The blockade has been really, really bad for the Palestinians there – but they’re not in death camps.  They’re not being gassed or placed into forced labor.  They’re not being exterminated like the Jews were in Auschwitz or Treblinka.  So call it like it is, don’t embellish the bad truth with worse lies.  Then you end up arguing about the lies instead of the truth – and that gets us nowhere. [Read more →]

Watch this video and this video and this video to get a look at what went on during the recent Gaza war.  They dig into the use of drones, the bombardment of medics and hospitals, and the use of human shields.  Not very pleasant stuff, but important.

Andrew writes, of Gaza and the American political reaction:

this assault on top of a blockade, carried out with an “iron fist” as the US was in transition from one president to another was backed by a resolution carried by unanimous consent in the Senate, and with only 5 votes against in the House. American public opinion, as Glenn Greenwald noted, was evenly divided, and Democrats sided more with the Palestinians enduring a blitz with some white phosphorus thrown into the mix. Is there any plausible explanation for this discrepancy apart from the Walt-Mearsheimer one?

It is odd and surprising that our representatives in Congress would so blatantly not represent public opinion on this matter.  I suppose that in some sense this is once again a sense of American affinity with Israel at play – and, likewise, American antipathy toward Arabs whom many American still perceive to be de facto terrorists.  Politicians have become so used to what they perceive to be widespread, unanimous support for Israel in the United States that they go along with such wrong-headed resolutions based entirely on expectations of what the public wants, or perhaps out of fear of political reprisal.  Affinity for our fellow democracy is certainly strong in the States, and Americans obviously relate to Israelis much more strongly than we relate to the inhabitants of Gaza or the West Bank.

However, this is changing.  Andrew called the war in Gaza the “last straw” and I agree, and I think many other mild supporters of Israel looked at that war with new found skepticism or outright disgust and dismay, if only because the entire debacle simply felt so pointless.  Americans may gravitate toward war – we’ve developed a grand mythos to justify our own past actions – but we despise pointless war.  We’ve developed a story for these senseless wars, too, which counterbalances against the “noble war” tradition, and in a sense further gild that tradition; which is why Vietnam is seen as the polar opposite to WWII, and can be held up as a contrast to other “good” wars.  This is also why the war of 1967 resonates with Americans.   It was a war that pitted Israel against almost overwhelming odds – it was a fight for the young nation’s very survival.  It was a good war.

[Read more →]

Robert Stacy McCain reveals both an inherent lack of understanding regarding the Israel/Palestine conflict, and an unhealthy degree of bloody, American-made machismo.  Really McCain, you think totally subduing the Palestinian people and then “rinsing” your bayonets in the Jordan is the road to peace?  You justify this fantasy with the example of Sherman in his Southern campaign?

Good God, are the United States Civil War and the Israel/Palestine conflict even remotely similar not only morally but in pragmatic terms?  In geographical terms?  Perhaps in terms of unnecessary barbarism, but that’s about all I can think of, and in any case it hardly speaks to strategy.

Then again the vast bulk of the Right in this country is content wishing the Israeli people well on their way to a totally militarized state, as if this sort of faux support will actually accomplish anything beyond eventual political isolation and entrenchment, so this sort of tough talk from McCain is no surprise.  It’s disheartening but it’s no suprise.

Note: RSM gets his snark on in the updates to his little post.  It is kind of shocking that a guy who writes this:

Swear to God, if they ever want a Gentile prime minister, my first order would be to deploy the IDF in a north-south line, facing east. My second order would be “forward march” and the order to halt would not be given until it was time for the troops to rinse their bayonets in the Jordan. After a brief rest halt, the order “about face” would be given, and the next halt would be at the Mediterranean coast.

…can respond to criticism with this:

Noted Middle East policy scholar E.D. Kain finds me suffering from “both an inherent lack of understanding regarding the Israel/Palestine conflict, and an unhealthy degree of bloody, American-made machismo.” Look, E.D., no need to be so coy. If you want to see the notorious Speedo pic, just say so.

Yeah, stay classy McCain.  Nice to know I’m a “noted mid east policy scholar” now, though.  I’m sure that wasn’t thinly veiled sarcasm or anything.  Then again, I have to hand it to McCain – he’s got a sense of humor.  Unfortunately that’s about the only sense he’s got, judging by his little peace proposition….

Reading over this article from Jewcy while I was looking for updates on the recent Israeli elections about the proported rise in anti-semitism in Venezuela under Hugo Chavez and Chavez’s support for groups like Hamas, I was struck by a question: is it intellectually and morally acceptable to attempt to understand where groups like Hamas are coming from and cultivate a certain degree of sympathy/empathy for the circumstances that have given rise to them?

This question is distinct from the notion of supporting a group like Hamas, which, by my lights, is a pretty difficult move given that one of its core principles is the complete annihilation of another state and its people. I believe pretty firmly that I would feel the same if that state weren’t Israel, so let us jettison both the “blind love of Israel” and “ignorant romanticizing of Hamas” arguments alike. I should also clarify that I am talking about finding sympathy and empathy in one’s heart for Hamas, as distinct from doing the same for Palestinians in Gaza generally — I don’t want to overstate my suggestion here, but neither do I want to falsey sugar-coat it.

The more I’ve thought about the question, the more I’ve come to the conclusion that finding such sympathy/empathy is a key component in understanding and successfully seeking a resolution to the generations long conflict in the region. For all my recent talk about cultivating a better interventionism, I continue to believe that there is no real military solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict, there is only a human solution (call it a political solution if you like, but what I’m pointing to is human beings figuring out a way and cultivating an openness to living together). That there will by necessity, given the players in this conflict, be a military component to the lead up to such a resolution, as has already been abundantly demonstrated, is a sad fact, but I don’t think it detracts from the reality that at the end of the day the military elements of this conflict will eventually have to become exhausted and some kind of human solution will have to emerge if there is ever going to be a “just and lasting peace”. To perhaps assuage some of my interlocutors on interventionism, I don’t take that to be an isolated incident in the Israel-Palestine conflict. I think it is true broadly that there are no real military solutions to what generally in geo and regional politics boil down to human conflicts, but I’m also aware that there are times when use of force becomes sadly necessary (so my whole track on interventionism is trying to formulate a better version thereof). [Read more →]

Following up on ED’s post (and the sad 60 Minutes video), here is another video on the Occupation.  Called Checkpoint by Israeli filmaker Yoav Shamir it simply leaves the camera’s rolling in daily interactions within the West Bank.  It’s brutal to watch.  Not because any absolutely horrible thing happens, but just the daily grind of occupation.  You see Israeli soldiers trying to be human beings, some of them increasingly de-humanized by their participation in this militarization of society.  And you see something of what it is like from The Palestinian side.  If something like this documentary were shown on US tv in primetime (which it never will), then maybe opinions would change.  What is so brilliant in my mind about it is that there is no commentary from the directors.  No viewpoints are inserted.  Just cameras and human beings interacting.

This is the first of eight parts (all of which are on YouTube):

–

Sadly my own view (like those in The 60 Minutes piece) is that the two state solution is increasingly a dying prospect.  And, what Gershom Gorenberg called in his brilliant book on the subject, The Accidental Empire (i.e. the occupation of West Bank) is at the heart of that failure.  It’s not the only reason but it is a central one.

Max Socol is unhappy with our initial foray into the Israel/Palestine debate:

Moral arguments concerning Israel and Palestine may be of incidental interest (i.e., did Israel commit war crimes in Gaza? Who is to blame for civilian casualties, those doing the shooting, or those putting the civilian bodies in front of the bullets?), but they do not have a place in the larger dialogue about solutions for the region…

The real question that we should be asking right now, and one that I have started trying to answer, is how the US can forge and guard such a ceasefire. I hope that now, in this new conversation, one of the “Ordinary Gentlemen” will take up the yoke of writing such a proposal, or critiquing mine.

Max wants to talk policy, not morality (though I can hardly see how it is possible to separate the two) and so I will oblige him.  It is important to note that I am an American and Max is Israeli, and I tend to try to avoid giving policy advice to other nations.  But I will address how I believe both the United States and Israel should act in terms of a broad policy approach to this mess.  Max goes into some great detail in his policy suggestions for the immediate ceasefire, which included a gradual series of re-opened crossings if rocket fire out of Gaza ceases.  Thus, a cessation of attacks out of Gaza equates to freer movement of goods and services in and out of Gaza, Israel, and Egypt.  However:

If, at any time, Hamas or one of its secondaries should resume violence against Israel, the process rolls back one step. (Rafah closes, but Erez remains open; Erez closes, but Karni remains open; Karni remains open, but Israel strikes militarily.) “Resumed violence” in this case does not mean a single rocket, or two or five, but rather indicates one week of continuous or extremely frequent fire — or one month in which Hamas fired on average one rocket every two days, or more.

The specific definition of “resumed violence” here may be the bit that counts most, as there is almost no likelihood of a total cessation of rocket attacks out of Gaza at this time or in the foreseeable future.  In fact, in terms of the immediate ceasefire, I think Max has a pretty good idea.  Nonetheless, I don’t think this plan touches on much more than the immediate, and even then, should Hamas remain in defiance–a fairly likely outcome–Israel is still left with an ineffectual blockade at best, and another outright occupation at worst.

Essentially, I can’t determine how any strategy in Gaza, any policy toward opening or closing those borders, can have any chance of long-term success without an equally intense focus on policy in the West Bank, and namely policy in regards to settlers.  So I would add to Max’s list, a roll-out of unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank in gradual steps, evacuating settlements in waves starting with the furthermost Eastern settlements and moving back, and ending with a complete withdrawal of security forces from the West Bank.

I think Israel needs to determine where to re-draw borders, at least around Jerusalem, without consensus from the international community or the United States.  Too many actors in this process will only lead to logjam.  The Arabs will almost certainly be unhappy, at least publicly, with any decision, but will more than likely grow to accept whatever new borders are drawn.  Pre-1967 borders are impossible, but they should be as near to the original as possible.  At the same time, Israel should negotiate a return of the Golan Heights for a Syrian peace deal, utilizing the Turks as mediators.

The United States should take this move on Israel’s part as an opportunity to work to financially prop up the new Palestinian State that would, de facto, come into existence.  US policy should cast aside completely the effort to impose democracy on the new Palestine.  That mess has been made already, and it would make better sense to prop up an authoritarian Fatah than to insist on elections or other democratic policies that would surely only strengthen Hamas.  The US should work closely with Jordan and Egypt in this effort, as well as with the Turks.

Waiting for an end to terrorism or violence from Hamas is counter-intuitive.  Israel’s only hope to regain a meaningful security is to end its occupation of the West Bank.  Once two states have been created, it is much more likely that the hostilities will gradually come to a close, much as they have between Israel and other States in the region, who talk tough but never dare to do anything beyond subsidization of proxy militias such as Hezbollah and Hamas.

What happens next is beyond me, but I think rigorous diplomacy with no holds barred is the only option.  All parties at the table.

Freddie writes:

While I continue to believe that our national conversation is far from an equitable or fair one, I have to admit that things have changed; there is more criticism and questioning of Israel and its actions than I would have felt possible before the conflict began.

I wonder if this is the case, actually.  Looking back at the 2006 assault on Lebanon, I recall a great deal of criticism of Israel’s moves, though to be sure, much of it fell within the realm of “is it good for Israel?” or “is it strategically wise?” rather than over the plight of the Lebonese, and Freddie is correct that much of the current criticism of Israel falls within this vein.

I think two things cause Americans to view the Israel/Palestine conflict through this lens.  First, American news media is extraordinarily reluctant to show images of war in too graphic a detail.  I recall the night we invaded Iraq, the Shock and Awe playing on my friend’s television, the green explosions and video-game quality of it all, the surreality of watching a war unfold and yet feeling as though the entire event was little more than another episode in a war game, or a television show.  Shock and Awe certainly sounds like a video game title, or a pay-per-view boxing match.

The fact is, night-vision airstrikes are sterile enough to show on American television.  The fallout from those strikes is not.  So when we are shown images of far-off explosions and told that Israel has moved troops into Gaza to stop Hamas from firing rockets into Israel, we have that same sterile, pc vision of what the war must be like.  Certainly there are the CNN clips of wounded Palestinians rushed off to ambulances, but even they seem at the most PG-13.  In essence, war seems very abstract, very clean, very distant.

Terrorism, on the other hand, feels very visceral, very real.  We can empathize with those Israeli citizens who have endured terror at the hands of groups like Hamas, who live in fear of attack.  I think 9/11 is largely responsible for this sense of affinity.  Then again, perhaps it is just the nature of terror that makes us so much more able to empathize.  Perhaps because terrorism inspires fear that it could happen to us too, whereas war has always been off-shored for Americans, that makes this our reality.

All of which is to say that perhaps it is the medium by which we get our news that makes us so much more receptive of an Israeli perspective, even when we are criticizing them.  Perhaps it is this and a sense that in some way, either through shared citizenship, shared ideals, or democratic principles, that we are more inclined to view things through a pro-Israel lens.

Of course, the very term “pro-Israel” is a misnomer.  As Freddie mentions, what Israel wants, and what they need may be two very different things.  He writes that:

only America ultimately can broker peace in Palestine. This is because the deep economic, military and diplomatic investment of the United States in Israel gives us the power to deeply influence Israeli policy moving forward. As much as countries like Egypt and Jordan can provide legitimacy in the Palestinian street, and as much as the European Union can act as a powerful third-party arbiter, the simple fact is that there is no other country on earth that has the power and legitimacy within Israel to generally effect change.

Indeed, in every significant move toward peace America has had at least a hand in the matter.  Carter, for all his flaws as President, at least played a part in brokering Israel’s peace with Egypt.  Massive aid packages to Egypt and Jordan from the United States have been instrumental in securing a lasting peace between Israel and those nations.  Always this balanced approach, with America naturally more amicable with Israel than with her neighbors or the Palestinians, but still acting as a broker, as a go-between for the various parties, has worked the best.  Which is why I think Scott is simply on the wrong track when he writes:

That America is in a unique position to help usher along peace negotiations due to its relationship with Israel is indeed essentially indisputable . But I would argue that in many ways, now is the perfect time for America to resist taking that front and centre role and exercise a more “behind the scenes” effect on this conflict.

Just as the Bush administrations refusal to ever deal with so-called enemies, or their stubborness in pushing for democratic elections in Palestine and then refusing to acknowledge the not-so-surprising results, has led to a one-sided and ultimately unhelpful handling of the conflict, I think a “behind the scenes” America would only lead to questions, suspicion, and ultimately illegitimacy in the process.

America needs to do everything out in the open air.  The Obama administration needs to sit down with all sides, even Hamas, and get the dialogue as public as possible.  True, Hamas states in their charter that they will acecpt nothing less than the destruction of Israel.  Very well, then when we sit down with Hamas and with Israel and try to dialogue we can hold that against them.  We can say, “How do you expect us to help you if you don’t renounce this?” and if we do so openly, in the most public matter possible, then the whole world can watch as they either reform, or refuse.

Similarly, America is in a position to ask Israel how they expect to achieve a two-state solution while Israeli settlements stripe the West Bank, and the Israelis will have to respond.  The more open these talks are, the more above-board these diplomatic efforts become, the better.

The media has a role in this as well, by giving us the news in whatever gory detail it may arrive, and letting us truly decide whether this is even a discussion that merits “sides” or not.  Perhaps the end-goal is not pro-Israel or pro-Palestine, but simply pro-peace and an end to the madenning cycle.  Without a newscore willing to show the ugly details, or a Government willing to speak openly with all sides of the debate, how can we hope to achieve anything at all?

UPDATE: This video with Jon Stewart and Al-Jazeera correspondent Abderrahim Foukara is worth watching, and touches on some of these themes.  Note when Foukara mentions that the only country Al-Jazeera has never been shut-down in is Israel.  Perhaps this is another reason we hold them in our esteem–they reflect some of our shared values.

Although I richly deserve a reputation as something of a polemicist, I’d like to think that I am not so shrill a partisan that I don’t admit that times have changed. In the beginning of the assault on Gaza, I joined Glenn Greenwald and others is saying that the American media consistently tells only one side of the story in the Israeli/Palestinian divide, and that side is Israel’s side. While I continue to believe that our national conversation is far from an equitable or fair one, I have to admit that things have changed; there is more criticism and questioning of Israel and its actions than I would have felt possible before the conflict began.

To be clear, even now to call American press coverage one-sided would to represent a major understatement. You can expect more pro-Israel coverage and opinion, simply measured in the amount of ink, space and time, by a large margin, in the mainstream media. More, and more importantly, what is considered pro-Israeli or pro-Palestinian coverage continues to be skewed. Almost without exception, those who are considered to be arguing from a pro-Palestinian position take pains to explain (as they should) that violence against Israeli civilians is untenable. Meanwhile, you will find plenty of mainstream figures, like Tom Friedman, in the pages of major newspapers and on national cable news networks, who enthusiastically speak of “punishing” the Palestinian civilian population. I am certainly not unbiased in regards to this question, but from my perspective our national conversation on Israel is made up of those who make every appropriate qualification and proviso, and are considered extremists, and those who speak in absolutes and categoricals, and are considered moderates.

Still, the fact remains that our discourse on Israel has undergone an evolution. I am seeing more criticism of Israel, in more places, than I thought possible. When Time magazine, perhaps the perfect symbol of mundane, middle-brow media in America, runs a cover story questioning Israel’s actions, it’s time for me to stop saying that Israel goes virtually uncriticized in the United States media. Granted, the tenor and content of that coverage remains deeply divided– you’ll note that criticism of Israel is made up primarily of questions of efficacy and wisdom for Israel’s gain, not criticism that operates under the burden of what is right for the Palestinians. But there is more criticism in the American press of Israel than there was even two years ago, and that criticism seems to have begun to seep into public consciousness, and it’s incumbent on me to point it out.

The question is whether this evolution continues, and vitally, what it means for American politics and governance. Because on the level of partisan politics in America, the unanimity on Israel is nearly universal. With a few exceptions in the House of Representatives– and by a few, I mean a dozen or less, in a body of nearly 500– there simply are no prominent elected politicians willing to waver from the established line on Israel and Palestine. I won’t go into the details of why this is so weird, in a deeply politically divided country with a partisan system that encourages difference between the two parties. Greenwald and Yglesias have already done yeoman’s work on that score. The question is whether this will change in the same manner as our media is slowly changing.

I’m hoping it does, for reasons I have written about at length. But I’m skeptical. There are many issues in American politics where even broad majorities can’t seem to make major changes in public policy. The reform of marijuana laws, for example, enjoys large margins in favor, depending on the phrasing of the question, in poll after poll. The problem is that although many would choose to reform America’s marijuana laws, the committed minority on the side of keeping the status quo is better positioned and better funded than the committed minority on the side of reform, who are (usually unfairly) relegated to niche status. Similarly, support for a change in our approach to Israel policy might enjoy broad majorities someday (currently, the best information I’ve seen is a divided electorate), but if the pro-Israel hardline maintains mainstream status, in comparison to continued relegation of the pro-even handed side to niche status, our policy might never change.

This is crucial because, as almost anyone will tell you, only America ultimately can broker peace in Palestine. This is because the deep economic, military and diplomatic investment of the United States in Israel gives us the power to deeply influence Israeli policy moving forward. As much as countries like Egypt and Jordan can provide legitimacy in the Palestinian street, and as much as the European Union can act as a powerful third-party arbiter, the simple fact is that there is no other country on earth that has the power and legitimacy within Israel to generally effect change. The sad fact is that, while Israel’s democratic nature gives it a meaningful opportunity for internal reform that Hamas does not have, political realities in Israel make it very difficult for a genuine, internally-brokered offer that represents a genuine chance for lasting peace to emerge. This is precisely the kind of situation where a relationship like that between the United States and Israel can have great benefit. The United States is uniquely positioned to show Israel a little tough love, put genuine pressure on Israel’s political process, and finally bring about the two-state, pre-1967 borders that has been widely supported for decades.

The problem is, instead of acting like the older-brother powerbroker that the United States is, we act instead with deference and apology towards Israel in the region. We fund Israel, protect Israel, have a degree of military interoperability that is literally unprecedented, and diplomatically shield Israel constantly. Any adult appraisal of that situation would suggest that the United States therefore has legitimate reasons to expect influence in Israel’s behavior. There are those who would claim that there should be no “coercion” within the Israel/US relationship. But there are two responses to that. The first is that Israel always has the option of walking away from its various entanglements with the United States; that would have consequences, but, well, that’s the price we pay for independence. The second response is that what people want and what they need are often different, and the same is true of countries. We can perhaps do whats best for Israel, and whats right for Palestine, by influencing Israel in ways that its citizens might not like in the short term. But we can only do that if we realize that we are not minority partners in this relationship, and that we have both a reasonable expectation of influence within Israel and a moral imperative to try to create positive change within.