The suspected assassination of senior Hamas military commander  Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in Dubai by the Israeli Mossad on January 19 has caused me a good deal of consternation from the outset. But this latest story from the Daily Caller showing a “soar” in the Mossad’s popularity and a run on paraphernalia bearing the slogan, “Don’t Mess with the Mossad” is just too much (h/t: Sullivan).

I’ve been going back and forth with myself for the past few weeks about why the assassination bothers me so much. Especially as someone who has reconciled himself, however unhappily, to the reality that in some instances state sanctioned violence will be a necessary evil in combating certain geo-political players.

One can’t deny how controlled and contained the whole thing was. As Andrew himself said in his original post on the matter,

In fighting murderous Jihadist terrorists, I have to say I find this kind of surgical execution, however awful, to be morally superior to the collateral deaths of so many innocent children and civilians, as occurred in the Gaza war under the rules of conduct the IDF allowed. It’s also morally more defensible than the US drone attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where civilian casualties are both morally deeply troubling and strategically terrible in a war that I continue to believe is essentially unwinnable.

I can’t disagree with Andrew on any of that, per se. I mean, I’m not prepared to completely forgo the conclusion that this man deserved to die and that the Mossad, if they did indeed carry out the operation, were the right people to make that happen. I can’t disagree with the idea that a method avoiding civilian casualties, innocent children amongst them, is preferable to one that does not.

But it is precisely the “surgical execution” of this operation that gives me pause and makes me shudder. Though I think it is sometimes necessary to use precisely this kind of state sanctioned violence towards certain ends, I correspondingly think that we have a moral obligation to reckon in an unflinching manner with the ramifications of our decision. I believe that no matter what form it happens to take, the use of state sanctioned violence is an ugly thing that ought to cause us grief no matter the seeming righteousness of our cause.

The ugliness of military activity, whether it is in Gaza, Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere, is always easy to spot. It is, essentially, inescapable. These more traditional forms of military might and use of force are honest insofar as they force us to grapple with the implications of our decision.

But the cool and almost bloodless efficacy of this type of operation — and assassination of this kind — it seems almost designed to lull us into a false consciousness of complacency about the tactics we choose to engage in dealing with, admittedly, unavoidable conflict. And in providing such a respite from the penetrating eyes of innocent children, we morally short change ourselves and others by willfully choosing a path of cognitive and ethical blindness and dissonance.

The natural outcome of such cowardice is a kind of self-serving bravado that cultivates slogans like, “Don’t Mess with the Mossad” and Marty Peretz’s borrowed line,

The Mossad did it. And, as Carly Simon sang about James Bond, “nobody does it better.”

Bravado of the like isn’t just offensive in the cavalier dismissiveness of its attitude, it is, in fact, anathema to the character, disposition, and fortitude required to actually bring an end to the generations old warring into which it faces. Bravado of this variety isn’t ultimately aimed at ending one of the world’s most horrific conflicts; indeed, it not so subtly feeds into it, prolongs it, sustains it.

And those penetrating eyes, we don’t lift them from our conscience, nor scrub their blood from our hands. Deep down we all know that, at best, we put them off to another day.

“The United States should follow the British example. It should initiate diplomatic contacts with the political wing of Hezbollah. The Obama administration should also look carefully at how to reach moderate Hamas elements and engineer a Hamas-Fatah reconciliation.” ~Roger Cohen

I’ve said before – somewhere – that it makes very little sense to embark on any diplomatic endeavor or peace talk if you don’t first invite all the gunslingers to the table.  If you go to the table to talk peace, it makes little sense to leave out the very actors with whom you wish to achieve peace.  So not negotiating with Hamas or Tehran or Hezbollah simply doesn’t make any diplomatic sense.  Critics of such talks say that they would somehow “legitimize” these players.  Would they legitimize them any more than waging war on them does?  Didn’t Israel’s two failed wars of recent years, the first against Hezbollah and the second against Hamas, have a legitimizing effect on these groups?

More to the point, Hamas is an elected political party within the occupied territories.  Elections certainly carry more weight than peace talks or negotiations in shaping world opinion.   Tehran’s nest of vipers have been at this now for three decades – do they really require more legitimacy than longevity provides?  In fact, I might say that refusing to negotiate with them gives them even more leverage, or at least places them in a better position to rattle off propagandist nonsense day in and day out.

In any case, the logic behind not inviting your opponents to the table for peace talks is only one of many precedents set in our foreign policy that essentially cause more harm than good to American interests.  Hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil is all well and good until it banishes from the realm of possibility hearing, seeing, and speaking with those who wish to do you harm and who might, just possibly be dissuaded through negotiations.

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There is something remarkable and frightening about the fact that Avigdor Lieberman’s Party, Yisrael Beiteinu, came in third in Israel’s recent parliamentary elections, gaining 15 seats in the Knesset, only 13 fewer than Tipi Livni’s moderate Kadima Party and only 12 fewer than the Conservative Likud Party.  Yisrael Beiteinu, which translates to Israel is Our Home, campaigned on an anti-Arab ticket–denouncing Israeli Arabs as unpatriotic, and calling for their expulsion.  The Party could very well decide whether Likud or Kadima is the head of the next government, unless the two should choose to form a unity Government.

Now, every Democratic nation should be able to choose who they please to run their Government, even racially driven, extremist Parties like Yisrael Beiteinu, but the fact of that Party’s success does call to question how long Israel’s current course will be sustainable.  I am a great admirer of Israel, which I view as a a nation at odds with itself, a land of hope and tragedy, a strange mixture of redemption and defeat, startling oppression and the promise of freedom.

The birth of the State of Israel signaled the last chapter in the long Diaspora, but has led to sixty years of Palestinian existence as a homeless population–a sort of new Diaspora spread out across refugee camps, occupied territories, and Arab cities across the region; lead by terrorists, nationalists, and religious leaders; second class citizens in whatever place they have the bad luck of ending up in.  Israel, once lively with the dream of the original idealistis who founded it, has over the years become increasingly militarized, entrenched, and anti-Democratic.

I do sympathize with the plight of Israel.  It took a number of wars to drive them to this place.  Those misguided socialists whose ideas founded the Zionist movement have all been replaced by more realistic leaders.  Unfortunately, the reality that many of these new visionaries live by – be they Avigdor Lieberman or Tipi Livni -  is one of stubborn refusal to make the hard choices necessary to bring about a lasting peace, and in some cases a stubborn resolve to see these compromises aborted.

Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, ostensibly a move toward peace with the Palestinians, was coupled with increased settlement of the West Bank, a region fast becoming a mini-apartheid state with an state; a three-year blockade that has severely damaged the living conditions of Gazans (who had already become a captive market for Israeli exports, and have now been made dramatically more dependent on Israeli mercy and goods through the blockade and recent war); and despite all of this, continued rocket fire out of Gaza, continued violence between IDF forces and Palestinians, assassinations, arrests, and kidnappings–essentially, for all the increased militarism on Israel’s part, it has been met only with violent reprisal and the collective suffering of Israelis and Palestinians.

And now, Israelis have voted into the Knesset fifteen seats for a Party dedicated to the expulsion of Arabs from Israel, and the continued expansion of Israeli settlers into the West Bank–a policy whose logical outcome is the total expulsion of Palestinians and Arabs from Israel altogether, or into smaller Gaza-like enclaves within the West Bank, surrounded by Israeli security forces, and utterly dependent on Israel for their continued survival. [Read more →]

Reading over this article from Jewcy while I was looking for updates on the recent Israeli elections about the proported rise in anti-semitism in Venezuela under Hugo Chavez and Chavez’s support for groups like Hamas, I was struck by a question: is it intellectually and morally acceptable to attempt to understand where groups like Hamas are coming from and cultivate a certain degree of sympathy/empathy for the circumstances that have given rise to them?

This question is distinct from the notion of supporting a group like Hamas, which, by my lights, is a pretty difficult move given that one of its core principles is the complete annihilation of another state and its people. I believe pretty firmly that I would feel the same if that state weren’t Israel, so let us jettison both the “blind love of Israel” and “ignorant romanticizing of Hamas” arguments alike. I should also clarify that I am talking about finding sympathy and empathy in one’s heart for Hamas, as distinct from doing the same for Palestinians in Gaza generally — I don’t want to overstate my suggestion here, but neither do I want to falsey sugar-coat it.

The more I’ve thought about the question, the more I’ve come to the conclusion that finding such sympathy/empathy is a key component in understanding and successfully seeking a resolution to the generations long conflict in the region. For all my recent talk about cultivating a better interventionism, I continue to believe that there is no real military solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict, there is only a human solution (call it a political solution if you like, but what I’m pointing to is human beings figuring out a way and cultivating an openness to living together). That there will by necessity, given the players in this conflict, be a military component to the lead up to such a resolution, as has already been abundantly demonstrated, is a sad fact, but I don’t think it detracts from the reality that at the end of the day the military elements of this conflict will eventually have to become exhausted and some kind of human solution will have to emerge if there is ever going to be a “just and lasting peace”. To perhaps assuage some of my interlocutors on interventionism, I don’t take that to be an isolated incident in the Israel-Palestine conflict. I think it is true broadly that there are no real military solutions to what generally in geo and regional politics boil down to human conflicts, but I’m also aware that there are times when use of force becomes sadly necessary (so my whole track on interventionism is trying to formulate a better version thereof). [Read more →]

While it feels like a long time, it was only two days ago that I suggested America not take the front and centre lead in trying to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Responses to the idea have been varied. Chris Dierkes found the proposal “intriguing”, E.D. Kain felt I was “on the wrong track”, and Max Socol thinks I’m dreaming in paleo techni-colour. Let me, then, address each point and try to flesh out why I made the suggestion and what benefits I see accruing to such a decision.

I’ll start with Chris, his assessment was, after all, the most complimentary (playfulness intended). Chris suggests that getting directly involved in the process is a finger trap of sorts, another quagmire that has no obvious solutions and where tensions are running high enough to make real discussion about solutions next to impossible. On these grounds Chris has a hard time seeing, “where Obama goes after doing whatever he can to make sure the ceasefire sticks for now”.

This is certainly part of what drove my suggestion. America is in an interesting place right now, part beleaguered from eight years of shoddy leadership (depending on who you ask, of course) that funneled it into what is perhaps an un-winnable war and an economic meltdown that has been snowballing under most noses for years, if not decades; part renewed protagonist shot through with the righteous belief of redemption. I don’t begrudge many Americans the joy of Obama’s election and I don’t think that election is insignificant, but the realities pressing in on the stability of the country are incredibly real and will take up no small amount of time, attention, and effort to overcome.

In short, the last thing America needs to do is get itself caught in Chris’ identified finger trap. In fact, let me suggest that doing so isn’t just a poor decision for America, it’s a poor decision for the world.

Despite my push towards realizing multipolarity on the geo-political scene, I also noted that there is no world in which American isn’t an influential player in geo-political issues. America still has a key role to play in the way that the world works, but it is, I and the authours I noted would suggest, one role among many. But for that role to be beneficial, the world needs a healthy and robust America, which is certainly no the current case.

Obama doesn’t really have a choice in whether he chooses to address the pressing economic (and in many regards I would add social) challenges facing the country, but he has a choice about how much of his and the country’s time is taken up with those challenges. I’m of the opinion that most, if not all, of his and the country’s time should be spent recovering, so as to ensure that future participation geo-politics is anything but a distraction. [Read more →]

Max Socol is unhappy with our initial foray into the Israel/Palestine debate:

Moral arguments concerning Israel and Palestine may be of incidental interest (i.e., did Israel commit war crimes in Gaza? Who is to blame for civilian casualties, those doing the shooting, or those putting the civilian bodies in front of the bullets?), but they do not have a place in the larger dialogue about solutions for the region…

The real question that we should be asking right now, and one that I have started trying to answer, is how the US can forge and guard such a ceasefire. I hope that now, in this new conversation, one of the “Ordinary Gentlemen” will take up the yoke of writing such a proposal, or critiquing mine.

Max wants to talk policy, not morality (though I can hardly see how it is possible to separate the two) and so I will oblige him.  It is important to note that I am an American and Max is Israeli, and I tend to try to avoid giving policy advice to other nations.  But I will address how I believe both the United States and Israel should act in terms of a broad policy approach to this mess.  Max goes into some great detail in his policy suggestions for the immediate ceasefire, which included a gradual series of re-opened crossings if rocket fire out of Gaza ceases.  Thus, a cessation of attacks out of Gaza equates to freer movement of goods and services in and out of Gaza, Israel, and Egypt.  However:

If, at any time, Hamas or one of its secondaries should resume violence against Israel, the process rolls back one step. (Rafah closes, but Erez remains open; Erez closes, but Karni remains open; Karni remains open, but Israel strikes militarily.) “Resumed violence” in this case does not mean a single rocket, or two or five, but rather indicates one week of continuous or extremely frequent fire — or one month in which Hamas fired on average one rocket every two days, or more.

The specific definition of “resumed violence” here may be the bit that counts most, as there is almost no likelihood of a total cessation of rocket attacks out of Gaza at this time or in the foreseeable future.  In fact, in terms of the immediate ceasefire, I think Max has a pretty good idea.  Nonetheless, I don’t think this plan touches on much more than the immediate, and even then, should Hamas remain in defiance–a fairly likely outcome–Israel is still left with an ineffectual blockade at best, and another outright occupation at worst.

Essentially, I can’t determine how any strategy in Gaza, any policy toward opening or closing those borders, can have any chance of long-term success without an equally intense focus on policy in the West Bank, and namely policy in regards to settlers.  So I would add to Max’s list, a roll-out of unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank in gradual steps, evacuating settlements in waves starting with the furthermost Eastern settlements and moving back, and ending with a complete withdrawal of security forces from the West Bank.

I think Israel needs to determine where to re-draw borders, at least around Jerusalem, without consensus from the international community or the United States.  Too many actors in this process will only lead to logjam.  The Arabs will almost certainly be unhappy, at least publicly, with any decision, but will more than likely grow to accept whatever new borders are drawn.  Pre-1967 borders are impossible, but they should be as near to the original as possible.  At the same time, Israel should negotiate a return of the Golan Heights for a Syrian peace deal, utilizing the Turks as mediators.

The United States should take this move on Israel’s part as an opportunity to work to financially prop up the new Palestinian State that would, de facto, come into existence.  US policy should cast aside completely the effort to impose democracy on the new Palestine.  That mess has been made already, and it would make better sense to prop up an authoritarian Fatah than to insist on elections or other democratic policies that would surely only strengthen Hamas.  The US should work closely with Jordan and Egypt in this effort, as well as with the Turks.

Waiting for an end to terrorism or violence from Hamas is counter-intuitive.  Israel’s only hope to regain a meaningful security is to end its occupation of the West Bank.  Once two states have been created, it is much more likely that the hostilities will gradually come to a close, much as they have between Israel and other States in the region, who talk tough but never dare to do anything beyond subsidization of proxy militias such as Hezbollah and Hamas.

What happens next is beyond me, but I think rigorous diplomacy with no holds barred is the only option.  All parties at the table.