From Simon Shuster, reporting for Time:

Then, on Jan. 19, three weeks into the dispute, Kazakhstan stepped in with a game-changing offer. It said that if Russia refuses to provide oil to the Belarussian refineries, it would be happy to take Moscow’s place. The Kazakhs also said they would be willing to buy a stake in Belarus’ Naftan refinery, which Russia’s largest oil companies have coveted. “The demands of Belarussian refineries will be filled by Kazakh oil,” said Anatoly Smirnov, Kazakhstan’s ambassador to Belarus, adding that the two nations’ presidents had already discussed the idea and “no one has refused.”

In most parts of the world, this would seem like a completely normal arrangement for two countries to make. But this is Russia’s backyard. And Moscow, which has yet to react to the Kazakh offer, may not take too kindly to two of its former republics striking an energy deal behind its back. The offer demonstrates, however, that many ex-Soviet states might not care anymore if they anger their former benefactor. A sense of defiance has grown in the region since the Russia-Georgia war, which proved that Moscow would not stop at economic bullying in its efforts to maintain influence over its neighbors.

In a multipolar world, every push by a country creates if not an equal and opposite reaction, at least some pushback from another country or countries.

For all the neocon fear of a resurgent Russia destroying democracy in the region, we see Russia’s actions are pissing off former allies and causing them to move in their own direction–as they too begin to acclimate themselves to a globalized, multipolar environment.  Belarussian leader Alexander Lukashenko is still a hardline dictator and it’s not like Kazakhstan is some bastion of liberal democracy.  They aren’t all of a sudden “good guys” (whatever that means) and we’re certainly not looking at a  zero-sum game whereby Belaruss and Kazahkstan are on the US side just because they are quarreling with Russia.

This is why narratives that sharply divide the world into autocracy versus freedom (a la R. Kagan) lack this kind of nuance.  According to that framework, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Russia all exist on the autocracy side of the ledger.  In theory then they should all be aligned with one another.  Schuster’s article also mentions Georgia – so what about them?  From a neoconservative perspective, they are the great beacon of democratic light in that area of the world.  Never mind that Georgian President Saakashvili (the great democratic leader in this formulation) instituted a media blackout and a state of emergency while heavy-handedly crushing protests.*

Nor does it make sense to see everything through a US-centric (in this case Afghanistan-centric or War on Terror-centric) lens either.  That approach would suggest we fully back Kazakhstan because they’ve supported us in the War on Terror and are now sticking it to Russia.

The more regional webs grow, the more every single actor becomes constrained.  This reality applies to all countries.  A more nimble US foreign policy would be willing to play both sides of the fence on an issue like this.  The US could largely avoid this regional energy dispute while still working with Russia on a number of issues.  Learning to play this type of multi-layered game is, I think, the only real way forward for a successful US foreign policy.

Every conflict is related to other regional conflicts and those to other global concerns.  As Dan Drezner would say, All Politics is Global.  Or all politics is simultaneously Local, Regional, and Global.  No set of policies and actions is ever going to be perfectly good (from any of the vectors of analysis) given this state of affairs, which is particularly true when one considers the counter-push and law of unintended consequences with so many parties in play, each with relations to each other and to the whole.  The kind of framework I have in mind for US policy thinks in terms of longer trajectories  within countries and regions, and is willing to live with incompleteness instead of trying to impose some artificial scheme across the globe:  e.g. The  War on Terror or Democracy Promotion, “With us or Against us”, etc.  If we refuse to adapt to a multipolar framework, US foreign policy becomes entirely reactive to situations on the ground, which are inevitably interpreted through these myopic, artificial narratives.

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*The opposite of such a black and white worldview is not simply the deconstruction of black/white dichotomies and some leveling of preexisting distinctions, but rather one in which shades of grey become much more important.

Here is Part 2 of last Sunday’s conversation between Chris and I. I’ve included about a minute of audio you’ve already heard to set the stage for where Chris goes. The audio is below the fold. [Read more →]

Michael Crowley ruins an otherwise good post on the Obama administration’s engagement with Russia over the Iranian nuclear program with this aside: [Read more →]

The decision to remove missile defense systems from Eastern Europe has provoked a lot of unusually silly commentary, but the latest from Townhall deserves special recognition:

It is all too reminiscent of the Hungarian spring, when the US stood by and let the USSR crush the Hungarian freedom movement. This appeasement will do nothing but embolden the most militaristic and dangerous elements of the Russian ruling class.  Message: America has retreated.

On the merits, this is just terribly confused. No one – not even pro-missile defense analysts – thinks that interceptor sites in Eastern Europe will have any practical impact on the effectiveness of Russia’s nukes. Their arsenal is too massive, their ICBMs are programmed to fly over the North Pole, not Poland, and if the Russians were to invade Eastern Europe, I doubt they’d be stupid enough to nuke the same territory they plan on occupying. Arguing that we’re appeasing Iran at least has the virtue of making sense, but even that doesn’t hold up because we’re developing another program designed to shoot down short- and medium-range missiles in the Middle East.

It’s the analogy between Hungary, 1956 and Poland, 2009 that really confuses me, however. I mean, how should we have responded to the Soviet crackdown? Should we have invaded Hungary and ignited another world war? It seems to me that a devastating conflict fought primarily in Eastern Europe would have been far more detrimental to Hungarian interests than a diplomatic approach that actually helped bring about the fall of the Soviet Union decades later. Obviously, this required some unpleasant compromises with a very repressive regime. Similarly, I’m not thrilled that Putin and Medvedev approve of our decision to remove the missile defense system. This doesn’t mean the decision is wrong on the merits (quite the opposite); it just means that basing foreign policy on the principle that antagonizing unpleasant regimes is always a good thing, while viscerally satisfying, doesn’t produce the best substantive outcomes.

Nuclear disarmament is the college debate topic this year, so happily I’m paying closer attention to nukes than to, say, taxpayer-funded prostitution rings. The latest development is fairly straightforward: Obama plans to disassemble a radar station in the Czech Republic and an interceptor launch station in Poland. Predictably enough, mainstream conservatives are infuriated: it takes Niles Gardiner all of four paragraphs to label this move “appeasement.” For a more measured view, I recommend this Peter Scoblic post from a few months back (emphasis mine):

Everything we learned during the cold war demonstrates that there is no such thing as strategic decisiveness when it comes to nuclear weapons–there is balance; and there is danger. If we were ever to build missile defenses that actually threatened Russia’s deterrent capability–say, by deploying a system with hundreds, instead of tens, of interceptors–Russia would simply build more nuclear weapons. If we tried to counter that increase with more defenses, Russia would counter with more offenses. And even if we “got ahead” in this offense-defense race, there would never be a point at which we had a 100 percent effective defense, meaning that if there were a nuclear exchange, the United States would quickly cease to be. Defenses would never be strategically decisive, but it’s always possible that Russia might fear they were–which would just destabilize our relationship. Does this sound familiar? It was exactly the problem we faced during the cold war, and frankly I’m not sure why we should have the discussion again.

Now, there is a case for a limited missile defense to counter a potential missile threat from North Korea, which is why we’ve already deployed a couple dozen interceptors in California and Alaska. (Unfortunately, Krauthammer is stretching things when he says we can “reliably” shoot down an ICBM. In fact, the boosters on the interceptors to be deployed in Eastern Europe have never been tested.) But there is also a case for securing Russian cooperation to pressure Iran to halt its nuclear and missile programs: Wouldn’t we prefer to prevent a nuclear warhead from being built than to try to stop it outside the atmosphere when it was a mere 15 minutes from striking the United States or Europe? In fact, we need Russian cooperation on other vital nuclear issues, including North Korea’s atomic weapons program and the persistent problem of loose fissile material in the former Soviet states. We can’t do away with the offense-defense linkage-but, even if we could, why would we want to? If slowing deployment of the Polish and Czech systems buys us greater cooperation on Iran or North Korea or loose nukes, it’d be well worth it.

Read the whole thing.

UPDATE: Mitt Romney emerges from the shadows to prove once again that his ability to mindlessly recite Republican talking points is basically unmatched. Having her crown snatched away by Massachusetts’ favored automaton son must sting, however, so I anticipate a quick Facebook response from Sarah Palin, who will undoubtedly compare getting rid of an ineffective, counterproductive system to Munich, 1938. Credit National Review with publishing this succinct defense of Obama’s decision to remove the interceptors, though.

Thinking more on the decision, I’m fairly surprised that this Administration decided to risk any political capital at all to get rid of our interceptor sites in Eastern Europe. Regardless of the merits of missile defense, removing a program that purports to protect the United States and its allies from a nuclear attack is always going to be unpopular, particularly when the counter-arguments are nuanced and fairly difficult to explain. I don’t understand the political logic of this move, but it’s a good decision on the merits and Obama deserves credit for for going through with it.

This is Sec. Clinton on Meet the Press last week. The first 30 minutes or so is worth the watch as it is focused on foreign policy and her role as Sec. of State.  The last bit is fluffero related to her thoughts on Obama’s opinon on Henry Louis Gates Jr.’s arrest, whether she will run for President again, and whether she likes Obama or not.

And the trademark Hillary laugh-cle (laugh/cackle for those keeping score at home) makes an appearance as does Hillary telling countries of the world they are very naughty children and Mama Hillary will put them in their right place (in this case about North Korea).

So be it.  She’s clear, she is well versed in the subjects she is attending to, and clearly has a more substantial seat the Executive Table than any Secretary of State probably has since Albright or very possibly James Baker, the last Secretary of State who actually knew what he was doing.

But in the end this is (unsurprising given the individual) more evidence that Obama’s foreign policy is basically Clinton Foreign Policy redux.  It’s America as Indispensable Nation.  She in fact all but says the phrase in minute 29:  “America cannot solve all the world’s problems alone, but the world cannot solve it’s problems without the United States.”

Actually Madam Secretary, depending on thet problem, it very well might be able to solve (some) of it’s problems minus the US.

Now it’s certainly better that the US takes seriously the role of other nations and isn’t replicating the first term of Bush II with its arrogance and wanton disregard for much of world opinion.  And certainly to be fair to Obama & Clinton, they are still dealing with the aftermath of the awful failures of Bush’s administration.  A process that itself began under George W. Bush circa 2006 with the firing of Rumsfeld, the hiring of Sec. Bob Gates, the more nuanced response (than a John McCain) to the Russian-Georgian war, and the signing of the Security Agreement with Iraq calling for the timetable for withdrawal (i.e. Obama’s campaign policy).  I know it’s sorta chic to say Obama is Bush’s third term, but that cuts both ways.  It would just as accurate, I think even more so, to say that really the second half of Bush’s second term was the beginning of Obama’s first term foreign policy-wise.

In terms of Af-Pak as now “Obama’s War”, you can’t say he didn’t make perfectly clear during his campaign that he was going to ramp in those areas.

In the end, though the Obama Team still sees the US as the lone superpower and all the rest of the countries in the world as responsible to what we declare.  Now they are clearly bigger fans than the prior administration of creating diplomatic “coalitions of the willing” to put pressure on said countries, but fundamentally the view is the US is in the right, is the moral leader and lodestar geopolitically and everyone else must conform to that standard (and receive goodies) or face pressure (mostly in the form of sanctions with this administration).

We have gone from a (lone) hyperpower world, to a hyper-polar one.  

Given that the kind of foreign policy from the US I would like to see is a ways off, if ever, this is about the best I can hope for (which isn’t saying all that much sadly) in the interim.