Evan Thomas and John Barry at Newsweek take a look at (a) revisionist history of Vietnam, now popular in some circles of the military and how it is influencing the current debate on Afghanistan.

I’ve written about this topic before, and I continue to think that the prime lesson to be learned, if there is one, is that the host government matters AND that the US can’t really influence any such government to become what it is not (i.e. a co-dependent shaky edifice).

But we need to back up a theoretical level first before approaching diving in more fully into the Thomas/Barry article.  A construct I find very helpful is the distinction (made by Thomas PM Barnett) between War and Peace.  If we take the Iraq II example, the War phase was the period of the invasion and the overthrowing of Saddam Hussein.  In Afghanistan it was the (very quick) routing of the Taliban from power with aid from the Northern Alliance.

The Peace (or Stabilization/(Re)construction) phase is much harder and much longer lasting.  Basically everything starting from the rise of the insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  It’s a little tricky in that the “peace” phase requires a great deal of military might, so the peace phase is not simply civilian reconstruction, infrastructure building, economic recovery, and the growing capability of a national government (complete with national army/police, etc.) though those latter points are really the sign of ultimate victory in the peace phase.

I’ll come back to that in a second, but first the Thomas-Barry article:

One that he [Gen. McChyrstal] has read—and reread—is a 1999 book called A Better War, written by Lewis Sorley, a retired Army lieutenant colonel. Sorley argues that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the United States could have won in Vietnam—if only the U.S. Congress hadn’t cut off military aid to South Vietnam…

Not until Gen. Creighton Abrams replaced Gen. William Westmoreland as U.S. commander in 1968 did the Americans smarten up and begin to fight a true counterinsurgency, focusing on protecting the population by a strategy of “clear and hold.” Instead of shoving aside the South Vietnamese Army, Abrams built up the local forces until they could stand and fight largely on their own—as they did in 1972, repulsing North Vietnam’s Easter Offensive with the aid of American airstrikes.

Sorley argues however that by this point in the game, even though the US was winning, the civilian population back home had already given up and were pushing the politicians (in this case Nixon who had run a pledge of winding down Vietnam).

In 1973, President Nixon and the North Vietnamese signed a peace treaty that allowed Hanoi to keep 150,000 troops in South Vietnam, just waiting on orders to march. In 1974, breaking Nixon’s promises of continued support to Saigon, the U.S. Congress cut off all aid to South Vietnam. Without logistical support or air cover, the South Vietnamese Army collapsed in 1975 and the communists swept into Saigon.

All of which sounds logical enough to me.  I can easily imagine that had the US Congress not cut off the air power to South Vietnam, the South Vietnamese government could have stayed in some stalemate scenario, certainly not in any sense winning against the Vietcong but at least not losing or being overrun.

Arguably as it stood the US won neither the War or Peace phase of Vietnam.  Though it seems they were doing at least somewhat better by the end.  As a result of that reality, the Vietnam era military adopted the Powell Doctrine which emphasized overwhelming force and a quick exit so as not to get bogged down in foreign countries.

By the Barnett reckoning, The Powell Doctrine over-emphasized (or only emphasized) the War phase to the exclusion of the peace phase.  We saw this in Somalia, Haiti, Iraq War I and so on.  The Powell Doctrine later got merged I would say with Art Cebrowski’s notion of Net-centric Warfare.  Netcentric argued that much smaller forces (than originally imagined by the Powell Doctrine), through the use of increased communications technologies and platforms, could achieve overwhelming victory….in the War phase note.  The Netcentric theory lay at the heart of The Rumsfeld Doctrine of light footprint and massive air/logistical power combined with special forces on the ground.  This guided both the Iraq and Afghanistan War phases. [Read more →]

George Packer has been digging through books on Vietnam as to what they may tell us about Afghanistan.  (George is smart enough to know that actually Vietnam is probably not the best place to look but it does offer some relevant information).**

His most recent post on the subject involves the new book Why Vietnam Matters by Rufus Phillips. According to Packer, Phillips was the only American who really understood Vietnam as a place, as a people, its history and governance.

Phillips sent a note to Packer that is reprinted on the blog.  Some key excerpts–but please read the whole post (and especially the whole letter):

I’m afraid the President, who seems like a supremely rational being, is trying to find the most rational policy option on Afghanistan, without thinking about whether it is feasible given political conditions on the ground, as well as who is going to implement it and how. What seems the most rational option here could be likely unworkable over there.  This is part of what happened to President Johnson during Vietnam. He relied exclusively on policy ‘experts’ who understood military and geopolitical strategy in the light of World War II and Korea, but who had no direct experience combating a ‘people’s war,’ while underestimating the North Vietnamese and misunderstanding the importance of the South Vietnamese, who were treated as bystanders. His advisers constructed strategies whose feasibility never got tested by those who knew Vietnam first hand…

I don’t see evidence of any real political thinking about how to deal with Karzai and the local political scene, no matter what option is selected. As we swing between counterproductive table pounding and passive non-interference, we must muster the will to interfere quietly but firmly when we are on solid moral ground—standing up for the Afghan people and for principles of honest governance. (my emphasis)

I generally loathe Vietnam analogies to Afghanistan because of its politicization in American consciousness.  But as a marker, both countries are examples of fourth-generation warfare insurgencies.  In some ways Afghanistan is pushing towards a potentially fifth-generation or open-source form of insurgency.  In other ways not.

Regardless, the track record of superpowers in 4GW insurgencies (and then counterinsurgencies) is not very good to put it mildly.  The key is that the wars are won while the follow-up peace cannot be won, while the advising crew (as per Phillips’ comments) still thinks of everything in terms of war.  i.e. They are fighting the wrong battle both in their minds and then on the fields.  Counterinsurgency is part of winning the peace and therefore relies heavily on the local government.  In the Afghan case, I think this is particularly problematic and I see no way around that impasse.

The individuals pushing for a ramped up COIN in Afghanistan–Petraeus, Nagl, Mullen, McChyrstal–would all seem to fit the bill of the experts who understand military and geopolitical strategy but not Afghanistan proper.  Nagl studied Malaysia (and of course Vietnam) and Petraeus/McChyrstal are Iraq War II guys.

I’ll just re-type that essential Phillips line: “I don’t see any evidence of any real political thinking about how to deal with Karzai and the local political scene.” None.  Nada.  Full stop.  Well that about says that.  [Read more →]

I was out drinking beers with a friend last night, sitting on the patio of a local brewery in the cold April air and waxing poetic about the many pleasures of living in a mid-sized city with lots of good local culture and a downtown that is thriving and healthy and non-corporate.  Indeed, there are only maybe one or two establishments downtown that are parts of larger chains.

In any case we were talking about something – I think the topic drifted to guns somehow (my friend’s brother is a gunsmith) – and a guy standing nearby burst out in a loud guffaw and approached us.  Right away I could tell that he was a transient – or at least a traveler.  Maybe a hobo (the train cuts through town about a block from where we were sitting.)  He wasn’t dirty but he had that way about him.  There’s lots of bums here for some reason even though it’s very cold all winter and not really a great place to be homeless.  I think the first thing he said to us was:

“There’s a special place reserved in heaven for the warriors, and it’s LOUD.  And Hell is just a hot L-Z.”

“Hell yeah,” my friend said, smiling.

“What’s your name?” he asked.

“Ben.”

He took an instant liking to Ben because he was the one talking about guns I suppose.  I don’t own any guns and I don’t know much about them.  I’m a Montana native raised by bookish, collegiate types with no interest in firearms.  I felt a little like Jack Kerouac, the perennial observer, while the conversation unfolded near me but not really with me.

“Benjamin?” the traveler said.  “The tribe of Benjamin?  The most vicious tribe of Israel.  Benjamin – the hungry wolves.”  His voice was loud and sharp and clear.  He wasn’t drunk, or at least not very.

The words came quickly, though, hard to follow.  He pulled up a chair and sat down.  The wind had died down but it was still cold out.  I could see my breath.  We forgot to ask his name. [Read more →]