I know that columnists rarely write their own titles but this Maureen Dowd column lives up to the awfulness of its headline. I suppose I just don’t see the nation actually freaking out as much as the political class is over the Nigerian bomber story, let alone the media.  The politicos and media are having a collective hissy fit, of course, but most people are worrying more about new TSA restrictions than they are about the attempted attack.

What Dowd is trying to say eludes me. Obama is too Spock-like apparently. He should panic with the rest of us. He should drag out Roman columns and fill the stadium and announce his grand plans to destroy Yemen, Nigeria, and Alabama in an even bigger, better War on Terror than the last one. Yes, the left and the right are once again uniting in their fear of the Evil Terrorists, and lambasting the president for just sitting there. Do something, Obama!  Anything!  Anything will do!

Then there’s Dick Cheney, prattling on about how Obama is insufficiently crazy – not nearly as crazy as the last administration – and is only ‘pretending’ to try to kill every last Muslim terrorist on the planet.

Cheney is trying to get the nation’s pulse racing, and Dowd is hoping to get the president’s pulse racing.  Apparently if everyone has a high enough pulse we’ll be okay. Fear is good because it keeps us safe.  Or something.

Me? I say we’re overthinking this.  I mean – who is the real enemy here?  Terrorists?  Democrats?  This guy?

No.

It’s airplanes.  And if we can’t keep people off of them with increasingly restrictive security scans, full body x-rays, no checked luggage, and hours-long lines, we should just get rid of them altogether.  It beats firing people every time something almost goes horribly wrong. And it’s relatively cheap. We could even use the dismantled craft to build low-cost housing, killing two birds, you might say, with one stone.

I’ve heard of crazier ideas before.

I’ve been largely out of the loop for the last week, so there’s quite a bit to catch up on.  A quick word on the attempted terrorist attack on the airliner in Detroit–and then a synthetic remark at the end.

Whatever else comes up in the pseudo-analysis of the (thankfully) failed terrorist attack, we see yet again that the terrorists are largely from middle to upper classes.  The ones who are recruited to perform suicide attacks are usually young and increasingly drawn from a self-selecting pool, communicating through the internet.

This lends credence to the notion that al-Qaeda is the anarchist movement of today.  It follows in the patterns of the Baader-Meinhof, the Red Brigade, and the earlier anarchist movements of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  Contrary to the right-wing US motifs of the early 2000s (which thank God are soon about to end), the analogy for an Al-Qaeda is not to Nazism or Communism.

The attacker came from Nigeria, a country in the midst of a transition to modernity. The revolutionary cadre–as in European history–always come from the upper classes.  It comes from those who are both exposed to and then ultimately break from the modernization process (cf Osama bin Laden).

But unlike Communism or Fascism, these groups hold no states, have no armies, no alternate world economic regime.  They pop up in hollowed out states like Afghanistan, the tribal areas of Pakistan, or Yemen.  They can recruit from other parts of the world (e.g. Nigeria, even US) but in the end can only perform nihilistic attacks.

Or as Matthew Yglesias says (also holding to the anarchist analogy):

I really mean that analogy to be read in two directions. On the one hand, I think people drastically overestimate the extent of terrorism risks and the extent to which Muslim immigration to Europe is some unsolvable nightmare. But at the same time, I think part of what gets people confused here is a tendency to underestimate how severe the problems of the past seemed. Catholic (and Jewish) immigration to the United States really was, at the time, seen as a major dilemma involving the integration of ideological, religiously, and racially alien people. And people living before World War One really were living in an era marked by a frightening upsurge in anarchist violence, particularly a volume of major assassinations that would be unthinkable today.

In fact it might be argued that al-Qaeda the franchise is essentially being subsumed into regional/local insurgencies:  Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Somalia, Iraq, Algeria, and Yemen. On one hand, this gives al Qaeda-ism (if not Al Qaeda in Pakistan itself) another lease on life, but on the other continues their slide into being swallowed up into local insurgencies, limiting their political influence and eventually leading them down the road towards a kind of mafia-hood.

Either way, the future of al-Qaeda lies in Africa as Africa is the next great place of globalization (or modernization) and therefore (as Horkheimer and Adorno argued) of counter-modernization.  [Either there and/or into former Soviet republics in Central Asia.].  With what in the West is normally called Islamism representing something of the counter-modern force (or rather a more conservative modernist force) and al Qaeda being the extreme, violent, anarchist wing of Islamic counter-modernism.

The “War” was never against Civilizations but was always a war within a Civilization (Islam) as it becomes shaken up by the process of globalization.  The West can (and has been) drawn into that conflict–and through the Cold War inserted itself into that conflict and fomented it–but the conflict is fundamentally about one between modernists, counter-modernists, and traditionalists (largely being rubbed out) in the Islamic world.

Or according to Vali Nasr:

If the global values of “peace, security, democracy, freedom and human rights, moderation, and religious tolerance,” have not yet taken hold in Muslim lands, concludes Nasr, it is not because of the “fundamental nature of Islam,” but  because the “commercial class that must spearhead the process of propagating [those values] is still too small.” Helping this “critical middle” grow and come to “dominate their societies is the best way of making sure those global values will take deep root as Muslim values, paving the way to democracy.”

Critical to that evolution is taking place is an ability to live with ambiguous and developing situations, letting the internal and regional dynamics of a country play out (e.g. Iran).  The paradox will be that as these groups come to power many, if not most, of them will be (at least rhetorically) more anti-American, but their presence will overall be a better sign of geopolitical stability (including the US).  See Lebanon as an example.

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Other thoughts as we approach the end of the year:

The Department of Homeland Security still sucks and has yet to learn anything about what is going on.

Yemen is fast becoming a mini-Pakistan with the Obama counterterrorism practice of air raids, training of local forces, pay offs, and all the rest.  Yemen has not yet reached (because the attack failed) counter-insurgency mode (a la Afghanistan).

Will asked me to comment on this op-ed by Jack Goldsmith and Benjamin Wittes pleading with Congress and the President to formulate clear rules regarding detention policy in the War on Terror.

Although I suspect I would strongly disagree with Goldsmith and Wittes about what the proposed rules should look like, I think the substance of this op-ed is probably right on target. The courts ultimately are the arbiters of what is and is not constitutional, and have to remain that way, but they are absolutely not well-suited for affirmatively drafting rules and that sort of thing. Once the Supreme Court started (correctly, IMHO) ruling policies unconstitutional, it was the job of the legislature and, to a lesser extent, the executive, to formulate clear rules to replace the unconstitutional policies rather than leaving an undefined vacuum. Perhaps the replacement rules would have still been unconstitutional and perhaps the Supreme Court would have been forced to intervene again. But at least some of those replacement rules would have been constitutional and would have formed a basis for prosecutors, detainees, and attorneys to rely upon, and Congress could have again gone back to the drawing board to fill the new, smaller vacuum.

Now, however, you’ve got different cases pending before different judges in different courts with little to rely upon other than a handful of SCOTUS decisions that may or may not be relevant in a given case. Whatever results from that process, including whatever rules come out of Judge Hogan’s chambers, are going to be of very limited precedential value. At a minimum, you’re going to wind up with a whole mess of rules that will likely be contradictory, and at the very least uncoordinated, and provide absolutely nothing upon which potential litigants may rely. Until you’ve got something that has the weight of a formally enacted law or, at a minimum, properly enacted administrative regulations, you’re not going to have anything upon which litigants can look to. The conflicting rules will also mean that you will wind up with detainees getting freed while other detainees with essentially identical cases languish in prison, with the only difference being the court or judge before whom they brought their claim for relief. Not good.

It’s not as if Congress isn’t amenable to taking second, third, and fourth bites at the apple when their legislation is found unconstitutional, either. For instance, in the various iterations of the Communications Decency Act, and COPA and CIPA, they made numerous attempts to legislate access to porn on the internet despite findings in each case that the legislation was unconstitutional. Eventually, they got it right so it wasn’t necessary to go back to the drawing board anymore.

Jamelle makes some persuasive points in this post on Afghanistan–arguing that the administration and its supporters have yet to make a solid case that the war is in the US interests.  As he says, the case is still “up in the air.”

I think on that specific point he’s right.  Attempting to build a nation-state in Afghanistan will not destroy the threat of al-Qaeda (especially if AQ is hiding in Pakistan and as appears likely heading either to Yemen and the Horn of Africa and/or northward into Central Asia).

But I think he goes too far in the other direction with this point:

There’s not much evidence to suggest that a stable government in Afghanistan will lead to a lower overall incidence of terrorism.  Of the major terrorist attacks (against Western targets) since 9/11, the two largest – the March 2004 attack in Spain and the July 2005 attack in Britain – were planned and executed within the respective countries.  Indeed, the same is true of 9/11. What’s more, and as Matt Yglesias has repeatedly noted, the terrorist attacks that we’re really worried about – nuclear, chemical or biological attacks – are unlikely to be carried out by terrorist groups located in Afghanistan, or even Pakistan for that matter.  In all likelihood, those plots will be developed and carried out by terrorists within the targeted country.

The Spainish and British cases (even 9/11 for that matter) are a little more complicated in terms of geographic influence/causation.  For example, the idea of the plot for 9/11 was thought up by Khaled Sheik Mohammed.  Not in Germany nor in the US.  The Madrid attacks were largely funded by selling hash and ecstasy on the Spanish nightclub scene (which in Barcelona in particular has a very global makeup).  The hash largely coming from Morocco.

And the British attacks occurred through the pipeline of Pakistani extremism.

In other words, while the standard notion that attacks emanate from one point in the world–i.e. a failed state like Afghanistan–and therefore we need to go and create stable nation-states where there are failed states is really flawed, the opposite is not therefore true. Namely that terrorist attacks only perpetuate within the host countries.

Terrorism is much more like (or is) a black market criminal enterprise.  As such it is global, like all corporations across the planet.  The concept of “citizenship” or which nation-state is the site of the issue is largely a false frame in this age.  As Dan Drezner said, All Politics is Global.  Terrorism included.

I’m playing devil’s advocate here, as I’m very skeptical (as I’ve said before) of increasing troop presence in Afghanistan, but the alternative of assuming that all interventions only make situations worse (which I’m not saying is Jamelle’s position to be clear) is no good in my mind either.

We need some framework for this muddy in between.  Which is why I was so pleased to read Dr. Thomas Rid’s piece in The Atlanticist.  I recommend the post in full.  It’s very good.

He lists ten points to consider in an analysis of what to do re: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the larger operation against terrorism.  Those ten points include insights from both camps–the Afghanistan is central to fighting al-Qaeda/US interests and those who oppose that view.  [Read more →]

I wouldn’t be so quick to claim that yesterday’s document dump in any way vindicates Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (or, as the rest of the world calls them, Torture).  In fact, if I were a fan of Dick Cheney and read his purported claim of vindication, I’d be extremely disappointed in the language he used to make that claim:

The documents released Monday clearly demonstrate that the individuals subjected to Enhanced Interrogation Techniques provided the bulk of intelligence we gained about al Qaeda. This intelligence saved lives and prevented terrorist attacks. These detainees also, according to the documents, played a role in nearly every capture of al Qaeda members and associates since 2002. The activities of the CIA in carrying out the policies of the Bush Administration were directly responsible for defeating all efforts by al Qaeda to launch further mass casualty attacks against the United States. The people involved deserve our gratitude. They do not deserve to be the targets of political investigations or prosecutions. President Obama’s decision to allow the Justice Department to investigate and possibly prosecute CIA personnel, and his decision to remove authority for interrogation from the CIA to the White House, serves as a reminder, if any were needed, of why so many Americans have doubts about this Administration’s ability to be responsible for our nation’s security.

I usually try to avoid writing much about subjects where I’m going to be offering the exact same perspective you can get elsewhere, but my initial thought upon reading the above statement was exactly the same as Spencer Ackerman, Michael Scherer, and Chris Boddener: Cheney’s statement does nothing to actually claim that torture (or Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, if you’d prefer) actually led to a significant amount of actionable intelligence.  Instead, it simply restates what no one has ever denied – that high value detainees were, in fact, highly valuable.  As others have noted, nowhere in the memos as they were released yesterday is there any evidence or even suggestion that torture/EITs led to actionable intelligence – only that detainees who were at some point subjected to such actions provided valuable actionable intelligence. 

Although it’s certainly possible that the heavily redacted portions of the two Cheney-sought memos contain such evidence, and indeed one can plausibly (though not with any kind of certainty) infer from some of the other documents that the waterboarding of Khalid Sheik Mohammed may have had some valuable effect, Cheney’s statement should make his supporters think twice about making such inferences. 

Indeed, if I were a Cheney supporter, I’d look at his statement and have a difficult time concluding that such inferencs are a wise idea.  Instead, I would wonder why, if those inferences were valid, Cheney’s own statement utterly fails to make them.  I’d wonder why a man who doesn’t have much of a history of mincing words would issue a prepared statement that so transparently avoids the central issue at hand and thus fails to make any claim of vindication on that central issue of whether torture/EITs actually made us safer. 

I would wonder why Cheney used the carefully chosen phrase “individuals subjected to Enhanced Interrogation Techniques provided the bulk of intelligence” instead of “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques provided the bulk of intelligence…”  I would consider that former VP Cheney has a huge personal stake in this issue and is, apparently, one of the few people with direct knowledge of how detainees were interrogated and what results those interrogations produced.  I would then ask myself whether it would be appropriate to conclude that torture/EITs worked in any meaninful sense based on speculation about the redacted portions of the memos and attenuated inferences about the unredacted portions when the man at the center of it all, the man upon whom my trust that torture/EITs worked relies has so blatantly refused to make such inferences. 

Then, finally, I would find myself with little choice but to conclude that, in fact, torture/EITs did not work and that the only real justification remaining for those actions is the justification that was there all along: naked vengeance. 

But, of course, I am not a supporter of Cheney.  And so it doesn’t much matter what I would do if I were.

I’m increasingly coming to the conclusion that both sides of the “Did We Torture?” debate are doing themselves a big disservice in how they approach their arguments.  This perhaps isn’t surprising since I tend to think this is the case on most controversial hot-button topics.

The pro-waterboarding side’s real argument isn’t that waterboarding, etc., aren’t torture, which I think is a clearly losing argument that frankly disturbs the hell out of me.  By making that argument, they implicitly concede that whether it is “effective” is meaningless.

Similarly, the focus of the anti-waterboarding, etc. arguments is also too much on the morality issue.  I say this not because the argument is wrong, but because it’s so clearly right.  By even arguing it, we give the belief that it may be something less than torture more credibility than it deserves, thereby marginally increasing the possibility that it will become acceptable in even situations where thousands of lives are not potentially at stake.

The trouble is that for the vast majority of people, the issue isn’t whether torture is moral or immoral, but whether the results it provides warrant the breach of morality.  For some of us (and I include myself in that group), the morality breach is never or almost never worth it.  But that’s just not going to be the case for the vast majority of people in just about any nation.   Similarly, for some small number of people, there just is no morality issue at all.

But most people in a free society are far more concerned about their personal morality and decisionmaking than they are about their government’s morality.  This is as it perhaps should be – what good is having a moral government if all of its citizens are robbing and looting, murdering and beating?  And of course, a huge part of being a moral person is taking care of one’s family.  This means that relatively few people have the time or the interest to concern themselves much with the morality of their government, at least as long as their government is dealing with them and the people they know in a relatively moral fashion. 

[Read more →]

Just to make Freddie and E.D. feel a little bit better about the degree of pro-Israel group think about which they have written prolifically, the US isn’t the only place where controversial views that fall out of line with Israeli messaging will get you shut out. [Read more →]